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JANUARY, 1962

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Editor:
CAROL L. THOMPSON

Assistant Editor:
JOAN BARKON ANTELL
Promotion Consultant:
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Coming Next Month...

LATIN AMERICA: DEVELOPMENT AND RESOURCES

February, 1962

Our February, 1962, issue is devoted to a study of the nations of Latin America, the problems of developing their resources and raising living standards. Seven articles discuss the following:

THE U. S. AND LATIN AMERICA by *Robert J. Alexander*, Professor of Economics, Rutgers University, and author of "Communism in Latin America";

ARGENTINA UNDER FRONDIZI by *Robert A. Potash*, Professor of History, University of Massachusetts, and author of *El Banco de Avio de Mexico*;

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BRAZIL by *John J. Johnson*, Professor of History, Stanford University, and author of "Political Change in Latin America, the Emergence of the Middle Sectors";

CHILE by *W. Donald Beatty*, Assistant Chairman, Department of History, University of Minnesota, and author of "The Recent Social and Economic History of Chile."

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Current History

Vol. 42

JANUARY, 1962

No. 245

Our January, 1962, issue is devoted to an appraisal of American foreign policy under the Kennedy administration. Eight articles explore the strengths and weaknesses of the foreign policy of the New Frontier. In this issue's introductory article, Julian Towster discusses the background of the East-West conflict and the critical areas for the new administration. He writes of "the relentless quality of Soviet foreign activity." Yet in the face of Russian pressure, "the military build-up of the West, Communist China's challenge and the growth of the 'atomic club' are strong negative counterweights."

The U.S.S.R. and the U.S.: Challenge and Response

By JULIAN TOWSTER

Professor of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley

THE SUCCESSION of a series of frightful unilateral actions by the U.S.S.R. in late summer and fall: the sealing of the Berlin border, termination of the moratorium on nuclear testing, and above all the explosion of superbombs of 30 and 50 megaton strength in defiance of world opinion, have outraged an anxious humanity and given rise to urgent queries concerning the emerging future. Outstanding among these are the questions as to the effectiveness of United States policy in meeting the Soviet challenge, and whether any hope exists at all that Soviet-American differences may prove negotiable.

A summary answer to the last query would be that single, isolated differences can and will prove negotiable. But the fundamental difference which is bound to nurture tensions and frictions—the issue of the basic hostility of the U.S.S.R. toward the United States—has little prospect of successful resolution in the immediate future. As for the first question, the stark truth is that American foreign policy has not been effective in great measure over the past decade. At best it succeeded from time to time in dulling the edge of

Soviet thrusts at particular points, but it has largely failed in meeting the over-all challenge of the U.S.S.R. The chief reason for such failure is the fact that for a long time our policies were based upon an inadequate understanding of the nature and scope of that challenge: the universal frame of the Communist appeal, the complex gauge of the Soviet policy-makers' approach to world politics, the singular character of Soviet strategy and the extraordinary arsenal of its tactical tools and devices.

Hence we have plotted our course along largely traditional pathways in the persistent belief that the subsidence of friction in one spot or reduction of tensions in another will usher in the reign of genuine peace. Had we properly grasped the full import of the Soviet design we would have long ago substituted a bold ideological program for the frail effort at so-called psychological warfare, and made the substantive unity of the West a task of the highest priority, alongside the military posture. It is clear now beyond a shadow of doubt that only complete comprehension of the Soviet challenge, plus an

absolute willingness squarely to face up to it, can save the West from progressive attrition and can open the way to real progress toward lasting peace.

Challenge at Present

The scope of the Soviet challenge at present can best be viewed under five headings: the blueprint for the future, the trifocal lenses of the Soviet leaders, the strategic estimate, the tactical arsenal, and the current priorities.

As a philosophical system and a program of action for mankind Marxism has long presented a positive and dogmatic worldview to fill the gap resulting from the breakdown of traditional values after the two world wars. And the Soviet leaders—Khrushchev in particular—have appeared to act from a conviction that they hold a trump card in the global struggle, in offering a solution to the four cardinal urges of our time which move millions to action everywhere: the urge for material welfare, the demand for national equality and statehood, the yearning for social recognition and the quest for peace. To a growing number of the rising intelligentsia in the new nations the very all-encompassing nature of the Communist promise has constituted its strongest attraction. And now come the resounding declarations of the new Party program for the U.S.S.R.

If, in view of past chasms between project and fulfillment, the Heavenly City on earth promised by Khrushchev to the Soviet citizenry may look to foreign observers like another version of Stalin's "pie in the sky," there is no denial of the fact that Soviet successes in science and technology have won many souls for communism, particularly in former colonial areas. If only half of the benefits in housing, wages and pensions, medical services, consumer goods and augmented leisure projected for the 1970's and 1980's are attained in practice, many more converts to the creed will be gained. Grandiose charters of peace and plenty—however difficult or remote their realization—always exert a magnetic effect upon the toiling and long-suffering masses. And Khrushchev's blueprint for the future is a definite and deliberate part of the over-all Soviet challenge.

Another component of that challenge is

the current *strategy*—the general line with respect to the world as a whole or large segments within it over a prolonged period, and the *tactics*—the specific plans, methods, forces and devices applied over short periods in particular places. In sizing up the state of the world and making vital decisions, Communist leaders have been taught that their first task is correctly to characterize the nature of the epoch. Secondly, according to Lenin, a good strategist must know how to isolate the basic link in the chain of events which—if seized—will yield control of the entire chain. And thirdly, on the basis of such a "scientific" analysis of the period the strategy and tactics are worked out—the goals and techniques to be pursued. These three—characterization of the epoch, isolation of the basic link in the chain of events and determination of the strategy and tactics—are the trifocal lenses through which the Soviet leaders gauge events to chart their course.

For Stalin the *epoch* was an age of imperialism fraught with inevitable war, the *basic link* was the achievement of nuclear parity, while the *strategy* was to gain time until such parity was reached. Khrushchev, on the other hand, has assessed the *epoch* as a time of "transition from capitalism to socialism," with socialism on the upgrade, imperialism in decline, and major war no longer fatally inevitable. Rejecting the Chinese Communist view that the basic link in today's world is the existence of numerous revolutionary situations dictating a strategy of pushing revolutionary explosions and even all-out war, Khrushchev sees as the *basic link* in the chain of events concentration on the continued growth of the "socialist camp" into a powerful empire welded together on the basis of economic specialization and coordinated planning.

Not that he is against exploiting revolutionary situations for the benefit of the posture of world communism, where that can be done without risk of a thermonuclear war. But for him the fundamental *strategy* is ideological and economic competition, rooted in the economic plans which are to place the U.S.S.R. ahead of the United States by 1970–1980 and based upon the assumption that the sheer force of attraction of the anticipated progress and the ample utilization of the mounting resources of the Communist em-

pire will bring much of the rest of humanity to communism over the ensuing decades.

Tactical Armory

The tactical arsenal at the service of this strategy comprises a plethora of tools and techniques, chief among which are the following: (1) trade, economic aid and cultural exchange; and (2) military assistance and support for guerrilla revolts—both aimed primarily, though not exclusively, at the new nations and colonial areas; (3) a mighty military posture—to bolster friends and frighten foes; (4) a diplomacy of alternating conciliatory moves and forceful threats—to divide opponents and disorient neutrals; and (5) unending propaganda concerning the grandeur of communism as the symbol of success in the present and the inescapable wave of the future.¹ Integral to this tactical armory are the issues which Khrushchev has been riding—like the four horses of the Apocalypse—in recent years: Germany, Colonialism, United Nations Revision and Disarmament.

As can be readily seen the priorities among these issues—or certain of their components—are intimately related to the current strategic design. Berlin was high on the list because East Germany figures prominently in Khrushchev's drive to forge a powerful bloc of the U.S.S.R. and the East European satellites on the basis of a division of labor and the dovetailing of economic plans up to 1980. The U.S.S.R. has long entertained a range of three objectives with regard to Germany and Berlin: a *minimum* objective—to eliminate the role of Berlin as a magnet of attraction for East Germany; a *medium* objective—to remove the Western garrisons and cut the political bonds between West Berlin and Bonn under a so-called "free city" scheme, which would inevitably entail at least *de facto* Western recognition of the East German regime; and a *maximum* objective—to confederate, de-nuclearize and neutralize the two Germanys, a scheme which would in all probability paint the whole of Germany red in less than a decade.

For all its difficulties, East Germany is one of Europe's largest industrial manufacturers and a veritable machine shop for the Soviet

Union and its satellites. The "bone in the throat" label which Khrushchev hung on the Berlin situation hinted less at considerations of military consolidation than at the fact that the flight of skilled personnel via the Berlin escape route (some 3.5 million refugees since 1949) was undermining his economic integration effort. With the erection of the wall between the East and West sectors on August 13, Khrushchev has achieved—unilaterally—his minimum objective in Germany. This was also one of his highest priority goals in Europe.

Soviet policies in Africa, Asia and even Cuba come under the broad issue of colonialism. As early as the 1920's, Stalin revealed his power calculations when he stressed the thesis that the so-called "contradiction" between colonial peoples and imperialist nations is a factor of prime strategic value to "the world proletarian struggle." Pointing out that of the 1.9 billion world population at that time, more than half or 1.13 billion lived in colonial and dependent countries, while the populations of the imperialist states comprised no more than 363 million people, Stalin argued that under such conditions the latter cease to be a source of strength for the imperialist nations and become instead *reserves* of the proletarian revolution. In other words, once these colonial peoples, seeking national self-determination, ally themselves with the world proletariat led by the Communist parties, they become—said he—a great flanking movement of vast import for the general assault upon capitalism.

Khrushchev has fully assimilated these views, currently designating as the second most important characteristic of our time "the disintegration of the system of colonial slavery under the impact of the national liberation movement," and including that movement among the "mighty forces" which can now combine to prevent the unleashing of a world war. In reply to the stinging rebukes of the Chinese Communists that he is wasting military and material aid on such treacherous regimes as the national bourgeois governments of the erstwhile colonies (Nasser, Nehru and so on), Khrushchev's spokesmen answer that Lenin himself considered it natural that "in the beginning" of any national movement, the bourgeoisie should become its leader, and that such fact

¹ See Julian Towster, "The Framework of Soviet Foreign Policy," *California Monthly*, Sept. 7, 1955.

"cannot reduce the progressive historical importance of the break that has occurred in the capitalist front."

Khrushchev's tactics for the colonial regions are to encourage the new nations to break away from all ties with the world capitalist economy and to build states of so-called "national democracy" on the basis of broad national fronts embracing workers, peasants, intelligentsia and national bourgeoisie. Admitting that the last named class may tend to compromise with foreign imperialism, the new Party program discloses the long-range calculus when it states that with the development of industry in these formerly colonial countries, the working class will grow in numbers and socio-political influence and by forming an alliance with the peasantry will become "the core" of the national front, i.e., in due time it will overshadow and outbalance the national bourgeoisie.

This is the theoretical foundation on which Soviet activity in the dependent areas presently rests. While castigating the United States Peace Corps and plan of economic assistance to Latin America as "neo-colonialism," the Soviet Union has extended economic, technical and military assistance—with about 20 billion rubles worth of credits—to some 24 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the last six years. It has exchanged hundreds of cultural visits with the countries of the underdeveloped areas and has not hesitated to supply them with arms, military training and guidance—all portrayed before the world in the most altruistic light. The tactical considerations are clear. There are risks in dealing with the national bourgeoisie in the former colonies, but in many of the newly independent nations there is no other leading force to work with, and on balance there are also promising possibilities. The Soviet leaders will be playing by ear. As the newly independent nations become industrialized, particularly those countries receiving Soviet aid, new opportunities may materialize to shape these nations more and more in Moscow's image or draw them into the vortex of Communist politics.

In this tactical design Cuba, Laos, the Congo and other trouble spots are calculated risks, shifting from shadow to limelight and

the reverse with the ebb and flow of opportunity and the changing fortunes of power. Cuba is too remote for any serious contest of strength. Where its chief value to the U.S.S.R. lies is revealed in the endless Soviet eulogies of the new Cuba as "a beacon and example" for the rest of Latin America and it is by this yardstick primarily that the nature and extent of Soviet aid is guided.


In Laos, the Soviet airlift of military supplies played a crucial role in the victories of the pro-Communist, Pathet-Lao forces. Moscow's agreement to a new coalition government rests on the conviction that under the "neutralist" Prince Souvanna Phouma Laos is set on the road to communism and will serve as a *place d'armes* for further expansion in Southeast Asia. But the form and pace of such expansion may well depend not only on the nature of United States and Seato intervention but upon the developing crisis in Soviet relations with Red China.

In the Congo, the size of the land, its tribal divisions and the problem of logistics preclude a Laos type operation. The Soviet representatives, who consistently supported the pro-Communist faction of Lumumba—and following his death the rump government of his successor in Stanleyville, Antoine Gizenga—are now back in Leopoldville with the latter's return to the central government as vice-premier. With access to the entire country and ample funds, a long range undertaking to build Soviet influence and fashion Lumumbaist sentiments into a national force is indicated. In essence the Soviet game in the Congo can for a long time be no more than a divisive tactic and a trading in futurities. But the possibilities for kindling old and new fires throughout the globe on the issue of "colonialism" are almost limitless and will undoubtedly be exploited for all they are worth in the coming years.

Conflict over the U.N.

Likewise will the issue of United Nations revision, now temporarily quieted by the compromise election of U Thant as Secretary General, come up again. Over the years the United Nations has served as a means of useful contacts and an excellent forum for Soviet pronouncements. The Soviet leaders never considered the U.N. to be an ex-

United States Collective Defense Arrangements



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY (15 NATIONS)	RIO TREATY (21 NATIONS)	ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) TREATY (3 NATIONS)	PHILIPPINE TREATY (BILATERAL)	JAPANESE TREATY (BILATERAL)	REPUBLIC OF KOREA (South Korea) TREATY (BILATERAL)	SOUTHEAST ASIA TREATY (8 NATIONS)	REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Formosa) TREATY (BILATERAL)
1 UNITED STATES 2 CANADA 3 ICELAND 4 NORWAY 5 UNITED KINGDOM 6 NETHERLANDS 7 DENMARK 8 BELGIUM 9 LUXEMBOURG 10 PORTUGAL 11 FRANCE 12 ITALY 13 GREECE 14 TURKEY 15 FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY	1 UNITED STATES 16 MEXICO 17 CUBA 18 HAITI 19 DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 20 HONDURAS 21 GUATEMALA 22 EL SALVADOR 23 NICARAGUA 24 COSTA RICA 25 PANAMA 26 COLOMBIA 27 VENEZUELA 28 ECUADOR 29 PERU 30 BRAZIL 31 BOLIVIA 32 PARAGUAY 33 CHILE 34 ARGENTINA 35 URUGUAY	1 UNITED STATES 36 NEW ZEALAND 37 AUSTRALIA	1 UNITED STATES 38 PHILIPPINES	1 UNITED STATES 39 JAPAN	1 UNITED STATES 40 REPUBLIC OF KOREA	1 UNITED STATES 5 UNITED KINGDOM 11 FRANCE 36 NEW ZEALAND 37 AUSTRALIA 38 PHILIPPINES 41 THAILAND 42 PAKISTAN	1 UNITED STATES 43 REPUBLIC OF CHINA (FORMOSA)

From the U.S. Department of State Bulletin, May 15, 1961.

pression of a true comity of nations capable of serving as the agency of a united world community and evolving in time into a supra-national seat of world order. Rather they viewed it as an arena of conflict representative of an international society in perennial struggle. As such, the Soviet attitude toward it in the recent past and the emerging future has and will be guided by Khrushchev's belief that the changing balance of power in the world in favor of communism must be increasingly reflected in all institutions of international life and particularly in the structure and function of the United Nations.

Lastly, disarmament has long been a favorite issue because—along with the slogan of “peaceful coexistence”—it makes good propaganda, as Soviet writers never tired of telling their Chinese critics. From 1957 on, however, the tactic of the threat of force has been considered of increasing usefulness.² Since the recent nuclear terror campaign—unleashed in an apparent attempt to convince friend, neutral and foe of the deadly logic of Soviet invincibility—would not jibe with loud talk on disarmament, the issue is now being played pianissimo. As the Party program and other doctrinal statements show, however, it is too valuable a tactic to be neglected for long, and Soviet propaganda will no doubt move it to the fore once more in the not too distant future.

These pursuits and methods constitute in their totality Khrushchev's current blueprint in the foreign arena. Yet the military build-up of the West, Communist China's challenge and the growth of the “atomic club” are strong negative counterweights. Khrushchev believes that the growing might of the Communist camp, ultimate acceptance by all of Soviet primacy within it, the variation of approaches, and above all disunity in the West will spell the victory of world communism in this century. What stands out boldest in this design is the reliance on the skillful marshalling and endless shifting of moves, tools and devices—aptly characterized as “orchestration”³—to squeeze every

political advantage for the Soviet position, and the relentless quality of Soviet foreign activity.

Nothing perhaps sums up better the very nature of present Soviet policy than the words of that old revolutionary master, Karl Marx, in *The New York Tribune* for September 18, 1852:

Surprise your antagonists while their forces are scattering, prepare new successes, however small, but daily; keep up the moral ascendancy which the first successful rising has given to you, rally those vacillating elements to your side which always follow the strongest impulse, and which always look out for the safer side; force your enemies to retreat before they can collect their strength against you; in the words of Danton, the greatest master of revolutionary policy yet known, *de l'audace, de l'audace encore de l'audace!*

This is indeed Khrushchev's style of work and the tenor of the Soviet challenge today.

America's Answer

This challenge can only be answered by bold new approaches based on three assumptions: that the U.S.S.R. will not engage in all-out war so long as the West is a military match; that it will exploit every difficulty in the underdeveloped areas as long as conditions of unrest and rebellion are rampant in theme; and that it will continue its periodic pressures on the West as long as it is divided. The dictates of the first assumption have been well learned, but the lessons flowing from the others much less so. Unless they are, the West will lose out in the end without any armed contest. One of the greatest shortcomings in present United States policy is its seeming inability to reach the intelligentsia of the new nations with clear ideological answers. Long ago Soviet political textbooks and ideological tracts should have been translated, critically annotated and answered, and the essence of these answers distilled and distributed in millions of simple pamphlets.

While the “Peace Corps” is an excellent undertaking, it is only a beginning. American universities should pool their resources and establish provisional branches within the rising nations, thus helping the latter in a most urgent need and building bridges of

² See Julian Towster, “Changing Russian Policy,” *Current History*, Jan., 1958 and “The Khrushchev Policy,” *Current History*, Nov., 1960.

³ See Philip E. Mosely, “Is It ‘Peaceful’ or ‘Coexistence?’” *New York Times Magazine*, May 7, 1961, and Marshall D. Shulman, “The Real Nature of the Soviet Challenge,” *ibid.*, July 16, 1961.

understanding in the process. And numerous other ways must be devised in the ensuing years to aid these segments of humanity and help to keep them free. But the greatest and most immediate need of the present is for the West to close its ranks in a most dramatic and definitive manner. A great idea was born on the eve of the Second World War—the idea of Atlantic Union.⁴ Had its significance been fully understood by the American people, the taxpayers might have saved billions of dollars and the West would stand as the Gibraltar of freedom in a safer world today.

A citizenry that can be aroused to mass anger by the fears of excessive nuclear testing can be educated toward the need of unity for the survival of the West. And the stronger such unity the more issues will prove negotiable along the entire range of confrontation of the two great protagonists. In the last analysis an enduring and meaningful

peace can come only when further Communist encroachments become impossible. At the present juncture of human events a Union of the Free has become the logical road for the United States to end the contest of the century.

Julian Towster visited the Soviet Union in 1935 and again in the summer of 1957, when he spent some time also in Poland and Czechoslovakia. During World War II, he served as a political analyst with the Department of Justice, the Office of Strategic Services and the Department of State. Later Professor Towster became Chief of the Foreign Political Section of the East European branch in the Office of Research and Intelligence, Department of State. From 1947 to 1949 he taught at the University of Chicago. He is author of *Political Power in the U.S.S.R.* and co-author of *European Political Systems*.

⁴ See Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now*, 1940, and *Freedom's Frontier—Atlantic Union Now*, 1961.

"... Today we are in this Assembly . . . 16 years older, but would anyone say we are wiser? The fact is that we have not lifted the scourge of war from succeeding generations or from mankind. On the contrary, what we have done is to prevent weapons incomparably greater in their destructive capacity than anything that the world has seen before. And what is more, wherever you look in the world there are quarrels, there are wars and rumors of wars and there is scarcely a part of the world today which is free from strife. And over the whole hang the hooded clouds of nuclear bombs, which have lately been exploded in Asia and the Arctic.

"... We stand here professing our desire for peace, but in fact we are mocked and disgraced by our own performance. The problem which faces us is exactly the same as the problem which faced the authors of the Charter. It is how to deal with an abuse of power by one country or by a combination of countries. The classic answer for keeping the peace is the balance of power, and it is true, I believe, that since the war it is the balance of power which has in fact kept the peace. It is true, too, in a nuclear age, that it is more important than at any other time that no one side should gain an advantage over the other, which would tempt an aggressor to action. But the balance of power is not the complete safeguard of peace for which men have been searching.

"Because rearmament, while one combination of countries feels bound to match the invention of the other, gains a kind of momentum of its own and history has shown us how fatally easy it is for that to get out of hand: and it is well to remind ourselves that the authors of the Charter saw only one answer to this problem and one remedy for it, and that was disarmament. Disarmament accompanied by collective machinery to keep the peace."—*The Earl of Home, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in an address before the U.N. General Assembly, September 27, 1961.*

Reappraisal in Laos

By BERNARD B. FALL

Associate Professor of Government, Howard University.

The American Government, the American press, and you and I along with them, swallowed "The Big Deception" from Laos, hook, line, and sinker; and when the truth appeared at last, we made scarcely a gulp of protest.

William J. Lederer, *A Nation of Sheep*

There is, let me assure you, nothing more egocentric than an embattled democracy. It soon becomes the victim of its own war propaganda. It then tends to attach to its own cause an absolute value which distorts its own vision on everything else.

George F. Kennan, *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin*

It is indeed remarkable how often and how significantly American diplomatic postures have been forced by circumstances to shift and how therefore we are caught with petards we were the first to hoist.

C. L. Sulzberger, *The New York Times*, October 4, 1961

THE PROCESS of evaluating a situation which has not run its full course at the time of writing is always delicate, for one takes the risk of being overtaken, or, worse, contradicted by events. This does not mean that the task should not be undertaken at all if there is a chance that insights might be gained or lessons learned which might be of some use in coming to terms with similar situations which might arise in the area.

Bernard B. Fall is the author of several books and studies on Indochina, including the recent *Le Viet-Minh, 1954-1960*, and *Street without Joy: Indochina at War 1946-54*. He traveled in Southeast Asia in 1953, 1957, and 1959. At present, he is in Southeast Asia on a Rockefeller Foundation Research grant studying the foreign policy of small uncommitted countries. His most recent publication is *Crisis in Laos* (Wash., D.C.: Public Affairs Press).

The three citations which precede this article explain in a nutshell what the major American policy problems—or, impediments to arriving at a sound Laos policy—have been: lack of accurate information in many cases; a certain unwillingness to face unpleasant facts; and, lastly, decisions made on the basis of those idealistic or not fully accurate assumptions which then have to be precipitously reversed under the pressure of events not in the power of the United States to control. The fact that both Sulzberger and Kennan addressed their remarks to American policies in areas other than Laos clearly seems to show that we are dealing here with a general problem of American foreign policy and not with one for which American policy-makers or operators in Laos are particularly to blame.

In fact, it should be said at the outset that the present group of Foreign Service officers and other American diplomats dealing with the Laos problem both in Washington and in the field is more realistic and more aware of the problems it has to face than most. That these views were not always reflected

in American policies as they were presented to the public cannot, in all fairness, be imputed to American diplomats.

The American Stake

One of the questions that often arises when the possibility is mentioned of American military involvement in that far-away country is: how did the United States get interested in Laos in the first place? A simple and not inaccurate answer is: France asked the United States to step in. This is a point that needs to be recalled (just as the often-forgotten fact that it was the French who first brought Ngo Dinh Diem to power in neighboring Vietnam) in view of later French accusations that their position in Laos was being "undermined" by the United States.

The Geneva cease-fire of July 20, 1954, marked the end of preponderant French military influence in the Indochina area. The outbreak of the Algerian rebellion on November 1, 1954, made the withdrawal of all available French forces and financial commitments imperative for the French. Economic and financial agreements signed between France and what was then the Associated States of Indochina in December, 1954, sent each of the three non-Communist states on its own way as of January 1, 1955. With American aid being now directly channeled to the three nations as well (by virtue of the Mendès-France-Dulles agreements of September 1954), the United States was now faced with Laos' problem of total insolvency.

Militarily, Laos was the only Indochinese state in which France retained bases, a training mission, and garrisons not only by treaty right but also by virtue of the Geneva cease-fire agreements. Here again, the pressure of the Algerian war was felt so compelling that succeeding French governments whittled down the French forces in Laos from an authorized treaty strength of 5,000 (which they never attained) to less than 600.

France also was authorized to maintain two bases in Laos: Séno in the south, with its good airfield capable of accommodating

four-engine conventional aircraft; and Xieng-Khouang, on the vital *Plaine des Jarres* in the north. Séno remained in French hands; Xieng-Khouang was never occupied. The French were to have a monopoly on training the Laotian army, but since the French training mission never reached even a third of its authorized strength, here also American aid was not unwelcome.¹

This, then, left the United States with two choices in 1954: either to let Laos take care of itself on a "let-the-chips-fall-where-they-may" basis; or literally to "underwrite" the country from chopsticks to air-conditioners. In the light of the policy of "firmness" then being developed by the Eisenhower administration after the Asian setbacks suffered in 1953-1954 (Korea, Indochina and the evacuation of the Tachen Islands), Laos became, with Vietnam, the pilot project for an American success hard on the rim of the Communist bloc. That policy decision was made late in the fall of 1954 and its implementation began as of January 1, 1955. On that day the little "Country of the Million Elephants" became a primary responsibility of Washington.

Much has been said and written about the American foreign policy-making process and its relative diffusion over many agencies other than the Presidency and the Department of State.² American policies in Laos were no exception: at almost any one time it was possible to discern elements of American military, intelligence and economic policies whose coördination with specifically "political" policies in Laos was at best somewhat uncertain, as will be seen later.

There were nevertheless four major currents of policy in the seven-year span covered in this report: (1) from January 1, 1955, until the elections of May, 1958; (2) from May, 1958, to the military reverses suffered by the right-wing Laotians in January, 1961; (3) from January, 1961, until President Kennedy's neutrality declaration of March 23, 1961; and (4) from March, 1961, to the present.

During the first period, the United States was mainly interested in propping up the Laotian economy and administrative structure sufficiently to save the country from total collapse. The latter part of that period, however, was already marked by attempts to

¹ As one Frenchman explained this policy: "It would leave us with the glory, while the Americans'd pick up the tab."

² See particularly the studies undertaken on behalf of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by the Council on Foreign Relations, Harvard University, and the Brookings Institution in 1959-1960.

steer Laos away from the course of neutrality upon which it had embarked under the administrations of Prince Souvanna Phouma,³ in favor of policies which were felt to be more congenial to American objectives in the area.

Policy Ambivalence

The second period saw the emergence of an American policy designed to make Laos a "bastion of the Free World." A strongly anti-Communist Laotian government was promoted and was given (or *felt* that it had been given) assurances of full-fledged American support in case of open conflict with the left-wing *Pathet Lao* movement supported by Red China and North Vietnam. That policy was explained by the Department of State in the following terms in June, 1959:

... to assist the Lao (1) in keeping the Communists from taking over Laos, (2) in strengthening their association with the free world, and (3) in developing and maintaining a stable and independent government, willing and able to resist Communist aggression or subversion.⁴

This statement of American policy in Laos was preceded by an underscored passage affirming that "*its major objectives have been and are being met with signal success.*" It was also during that period that the policies of American military, economic and intelligence agencies operating in Laos most closely paralleled those of the diplomats.

The third policy period, for all its brevity, was perhaps the most interesting, for it involved a changeover of administrations in the United States as well as the emergence of a realization in Washington that a solution of the Laotian problem was unlikely to be found in either the threat or the actuality of military intervention. Issued on January 7, 1961, in the form of a White Paper, the new policy was clearly transitional and aimed

more at reassuring both friend and foe than at solving the Laos tangle:

The United States believes that it can best contribute to a solution of the Laos problem:

First, by attempting to further international recognition and understanding of the true nature of Communist intentions and actions in Laos;

Second, by the United States itself continuing clearly to show that it has no desire to establish a Western military position in Laos;

Third, by joining with other free nations to support and maintain the independence of Laos through whatever measures seem most promising.

The first point of the White Paper policy statement was, for all its verbiage, little else but a watering down of point (1) of the previous statement; while the second point completely annulled the "bulwark" concept contained in the earlier policy. The third point left open the possibility of a military counter-threat—but the Communists in all probability knew what weight to attach to such a threat under the circumstances.

It was during that crucial period that American policies clearly diverged according to the viewpoint of each agency involved: the American Embassy in Vientiane was in favor of supporting the neutralist Souvanna Phouma,⁵ while the military and the C.I.A. were in favor of Right-wing General Phoumi Nosavan. Among the latter again, the military, while in favor of a right-wing solution, did not feel that the Laotian army was quite ready to take on the *Pathet Lao*; while the C.I.A. felt that "polarization"—i.e., forcing the middle-of-the-road elements to take sides with either the pro-American faction or the *Pathet Lao*—was in itself a salutary process that would swing key Laotian elements in the West's favor.

As it turned out, "polarization" went entirely in favor of the pro-Communists, with Souvanna Phouma and Captain Kong-Lê's paratroops⁶ making common cause with rebel Prince Souphanouvong.

By the time the Kennedy administration got its feet on the ground in Washington, the military situation had so completely deteriorated in Laos as to make anything but American intervention on the largest scale totally meaningless.

The new American policy was presented

³ Souvanna Phouma, "Laos: le fond du problème," in *France-Asie*, No. 166, Tokyo, March-April, 1961. It should be noted, once and for all, that Laotian patronyms are of recent creation. Hence, Souvanna Phouma's half-brother is not named Souvanna Vong, but *Souphanouvong*—just as their deceased older brother went by the name of Phetsarath.

⁴ Department of State, mimeographed comment on the House Report "U.S. Aid Operations in Laos," Washington, 1959, p. 2.

⁵ Beech, Keyes, "How Uncle Sam Fumbled in Laos," *Saturday Evening Post*, April 22, 1961. There are several other sources for that assertion.

⁶ It will be remembered that Captain Kong-Lê was an American-trained Laotian paratroop officer who engineered a *coup d'état* in Vientiane on August 9, 1960, which brought neutralist Souvanna Phouma back to power. Cf. Thomas E. Ennis, "Operation Survival in Laos," *Current History*, March, 1961, pp. 153-158.

by the President personally at a televised press conference on March 23, 1961. Its difference in emphasis was dramatic and unmistakable:

... we strongly and unreservedly support the goal of a neutral and independent Laos tied to no outside power or group of powers, threatening no one, and free from any domination.

Part of the next paragraph was designed to reestablish *credence*—as against the much overused and misunderstood term “credibility”—in American promises of non-interference in Laos:

... And if in the past there has been any possible ground for misunderstanding of our desire for a truly neutral Laos, there should be none now.

President Kennedy’s statement, like those of his predecessors, contained two more points; the second reiterated for the record the existence of a military counter-threat; while the third swallowed the bitter pill of an international conference (an idea still termed “unrealistic” a few weeks earlier) to settle the Laos problem.

An interesting example of the absence of accurate information on the situation in Laos were the three maps on Communist progress in that country which the President used to illustrate his statement: *none* of the maps (purporting to show Pathet Lao holdings in Laos in August, 1960, December, 1960, and March, 1961) were even remotely accurate in their overoptimism; nor had they taken into account published news reports of severe Communist attacks in areas marked on those maps as fully government-controlled.⁷

Thus, in less than *four* months—between December, 1960, and March, 1961—Ameri-

can policies in Laos had run the gamut from the Dullesian concept of Laos as a “Bastion of the Free World” to the hope, imposed through events beyond American control, that Laos would, at best, remain an effectively neutral buffer. And the chances of Laos being able to maintain its buffer character are, as of the end of 1961, extremely slim.

Policy Rationales

But perhaps even more interesting than the bare outlines of the policies themselves are the rationales with which those policies were explained to the Congress and the public at large. It must first be clearly understood, of course, that the United States as a country indeed “swallowed the ‘Big Deception’ from Laos, hook, line, and sinker.” If Captain Lederer’s judgment were to be considered as somewhat too flamboyant, a Rand Corporation report on the 1959 Laos crisis⁸ had this to say about American public reaction to the then exaggerated news about North Vietnamese support to the Pathet Lao:

... from the start the American public was given to expect some degree of Viet-Minh participation. For this reason Vientiane’s accusation ... that there was a large Viet-Minh participation in an otherwise undistinguished local affair was accepted in the United States. ... This accusation, made in advance of evidence, ... was presented in the most casual ways.⁹

Not one major segment of the American press can pride itself on having escaped misreporting the various Laos crises of the past four years. Surprisingly enough, the most reliable and so-called “liberal” newspapers were among the worst offenders,¹⁰ with such widely divergent media as the *Wall Street Journal*, *Time*, and *The New Republic* (among very few others) reporting the story straight. This must be constantly kept in mind as one examines more closely the major premises upon which American policies in Laos were built.

One of the first choices that had to be made was to determine the key local vehicle for an American policy in Laos. The vehicle chosen for that purpose was, as in many other Asian countries, the Army. In the words of J. Graham Parsons, a former ambassador to

⁷ To cite but one precise example, the *Washington Post* of October 19, 1959, reported that 50 villages in the southernmost provinces of Champassak and Attapeu were under Communist control; on October 21, 1959, Pathet-Lao forces raided the provincial capital of Pakse, while Lao Army sources announced that they had evacuated ten out of twelve army posts in the area, leaving “nearly one-half of the territory of the southern provinces in Communist control.” *The New York Times* of October 15, 1961 devoted a long article to Communist guerrillas in Vietnam filtering through southern Laos, but still showed the hill areas of southern Laos as under government control. They had not been government controlled since 1957 in most cases, and since 1945 in some.

⁸ For a study of the international aspects of the 1959 crisis, see B. Fall, “The Laos Tangle,” *International Journal*, XVI, 2, Toronto, spring, 1961.

⁹ Halpern, A. M., and Freedman, H. B., *Communist Strategy in Laos*, (RM-2561), Santa Monica: The Rand Corp., 1960.

¹⁰ For a detailed study of the press reporting problem, see Fall, *Crisis in Laos*, Washington, 1962: Public Affairs Press.

Laos and later assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, "in the case of Laos . . . the Army is virtually the only branch of the Laos Government service . . . which reaches the countryside . . . in remote places."¹¹

That the decision to make the Laotian army the mainstay of American operations in Laos was based on *political* rather than military considerations is best shown by the fact that until 1959 the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff refused to recommend a set "force level" for the Royal Laotian army. The figure of 25,000 men which was later arrived at (it was to increase by 1961 to a United States-supported force of about 40,000) was, in the words of a Congressional report, "*based on a political determination, made by the Department of State contrary to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . military judgments have been disregarded.*"¹²

In its own comment on the Committee's report, the Department of State argued (in June, 1959, i.e., *before* the outbreak of actual fighting in Laos) that ". . . events have justified from a military as well as a political standpoint the determination of the force level." While it is always unkind to judge with the benefit of hindsight, it must be said in all fairness that events in Laos since 1959 have fully borne out the Joint Chiefs' erstwhile fears that the adoption of a strong Laotian military stance would produce few favorable and lasting effects—military as well as political.

And in the economic field, the very size of the military establishment mortgaged almost

all American aid to the support of what turned out to be the most expensive non-American soldier in the world.¹³ It also brought in its wake a great deal of corruption, along with a tendency among the Right-wing Laotian leaders "to view the trickle of [American] military aid as the prelude to a huge flood of equipment and an adequate training mission."¹⁴

This overconfidence in all-out American support influenced Laotian policies which were bound to bring about strong Communist reactions: the arrest of all the Pathet Lao leaders in May, 1959; the elimination of Pathet Lao elements from the government; a marked rapprochement with strongly pro-Western Thailand and South Vietnam; the establishment of a Nationalist Chinese consulate general in Vientiane; and the arrival of an American training mission in the country.¹⁵

The fact that the Pathet Lao forces—which, in 1959, barely exceeded 2,500 men—literally made hash out of the 29,000-man Laotian army by a process which included very little shooting and a great deal of psychological "intoxication,"¹⁶ closed the first round of the attempt at making Laos a "bastion." The *coup* of paratroop Captain Kong-Lê in August, 1960, which had some serious anti-American overtones and brought the return of a neutralist regime under Souvanna Phouma, was a serious blow to the whole frame of reference under which American policies had operated in Laos. It compelled Washington to adopt a new Laotian policy altogether.

Polarization

Kong-Lê not only had given Laotian neutralism a new "corporate image" by his flamboyance and youth,¹⁷ but he had also given it some respectable military strength. He commanded the Second Lao Paratroop Battalion which represented the fine edge of the Laotian armed forces. This singularly complicated, in American terms, the whole picture and added another factor of uncertainty to a situation which was abundantly provided with uncertainty.

At the same time, the Laotian Right-wing which, until that time, had been a rather diffuse force, began to form a nucleus of apparent strength around General Phoumi

¹¹ U.S. Senate, typescript of appointment hearings of J. Graham Parsons, May 26, 1959, p. 15.

¹² House of Representatives, Committee on Government Operations, *U.S. Aid Operations in Laos*, June 15, 1959, p. 8. This should dispose of some accusations about "Pentagon saberrattling in Laos." Italics in original text.

¹³ The per-capita cost of a U.S. soldier is estimated at \$2,200 p.a.; that of a U.S.-supported Allied soldier at \$848 on a worldwide average; with a Pakistani costing, for example, \$485 and a Greek \$424. The average yearly cost to the U.S. of a Laotian soldier was well over \$1,000.

¹⁴ Halpern, A. M., *op. cit.*, p. 45.

¹⁵ Raymond, Jack, "U.S. General Runs Quiet Laos Team," *The New York Times*, January 9, 1961.

¹⁶ One of the unexpected and most pernicious results of the Laotian government's consistent exaggeration of Communist invasion reports was that its own soldiers began to believe that they were constantly faced with overwhelming enemy forces, with dire results to their steadfastness. Cf. *The New York Times*, April 23, 1961, among many other sources.

¹⁷ For example, 100 students of the Vientiane *lycée* followed Kong-Lê into the jungle when he fled Vientiane in December, 1960 (*Le Figaro*, January 13, 1961). Beech also reported that Kong-Lê "was no angel but that many Laotians felt that he was on the side of the angels. . . ."

Nosavan, a nephew of Thailand's strong man, Marshal Sarit (and a brilliant former student at France's war college). Thus, while Souvanna Phouma attempted to rebuild a neutralist policy on the basis of where he had left it in 1958, the United States had made a policy decision in a different direction. In the words of a cover story by the usually well-informed *Time*:

... Though the U. S. had recognized the Kong-Lê—Prince Souvanna government, it soon shifted the bulk of its aid to General Phoumi. The aim, explained the CIA, who called Phoumi "our boy," was to "polarize" the Communist and anti-Communist factions in Laos.¹⁸

The "polarization" phase of American policies in Laos can be said to have begun almost immediately after the rise to power of Souvanna Phouma in August, 1960. It ended with the conquest of Laos' administrative capital, Vientiane, by General Phoumi's Right-wing forces on December 16 of the same year. There were economic, military and diplomatic aspects to the implementation of that policy.

The economic aspect consisted of a two-pronged pressure on Vientiane: for example, Thailand (which controls nearly all presently-available communication lines with Laos) purely and simply established a land blockade. Soon 10,000 tons of United States aid deliveries for Laos piled up in warehouses in Bangkok while Laos was running out of essential supplies, such as fuel for its trucks, planes and electrical plants. However, supplies destined to the Right-wing forces concentrated around the southern town of Savannakhet experienced no such troubles. At the same time, the United States, under a limited agreement with Souvanna Phouma which was to give rise to much controversy later on, continued to pay both the Laotian army contingents under control of Vientiane and those under control of Phoumi in Savannakhet (technically in a state of rebellion).

Militarily, after several denials and admissions on the part of the United States Embassy in Vientiane, the Department of Defense and I.C.A. during the first week of October, 1960, it was finally made clear that

military aid to Vientiane had been cut off "until clarification of the situation." At the same time, 200 newly-trained Laotian paratroops who had returned from Thailand were allowed to go to Phoumi-held Paksé, instead of to the northern army post of Xieng-Khouang, where Souvanna Phouma had requested that they be sent.

On the diplomatic front, United States Secretary of State Christian A. Herter made the fateful decision of sending Assistant Secretary J. Graham Parsons to Vientiane to attempt once more to bring Souvanna Phouma back to a less-than-neutralist line. Parsons, an able and energetic man, had been the personal choice of his predecessor, Walter S. Robertson, to the post he occupied. As had been shown before, he had been (and took considerable pride in this) the architect of the "hard" line on Laos; the best that could be said about his relations with Souvanna Phouma was that they lacked a great deal of warmth. While Parsons abstained from making his views about Souvanna a matter of public record, the latter was to say of Parsons in January, 1961:

... He understood nothing about Asia and nothing about Laos. The Assistant Secretary of State is the most reprehensible and nefarious of men.

He is the ignominious architect of disastrous American policy [sic] toward Laos. He and others like him are responsible for the recent spilling of Lao blood. . . .¹⁹

While it was never made public what the exact tenor of the proposals was that Parsons carried to Souvanna Phouma on October 12, 1960, those proposals in essence demanded that Souvanna immediately cease his negotiations with the Pathet Lao; that he give Phoumi's supporters a preponderant voice in government; and that he put an effective damper on Kong-Lê and his followers. Other conditions (mainly in exchange for the resumption of American aid to Vientiane) were said to include the cessation, on the part of the Vientiane regime, of any military operations against Phoumi's forces and its acceptance—which, according to American sources, Souvanna gave in writing—of continued United States aid to the Right-wing forces in Savannakhet. In connection with United States aid to the latter, the United States promised that such weapons

¹⁸ *Time*, March 17, 1961; *Washington Post*, January 22, 1961; Beech, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ *The New York Times*, January 20, 1961.

would "never" be used against the Vientiane regime.

When those weapons were used with disastrous effect on Vientiane during the fighting of December 12–15, 1960, American sources acknowledged that the assurances had been given but that they "subsequently were unable to restrain General Phoumi Nosavan."²⁰

In spite of a last-minute appeal by Parsons to the King of Laos (over the head of Souvanna Phouma), his mission ended a total failure. Souvanna considered the American conditions as amounting to total capitulation. In a press conference held on October 16, Souvanna bluntly stated his case: "If the Americans understand our position, that's all right. But if not—too bad."²¹

What he meant by the latter was clear to everyone. While Parsons had flown to the royal residence at Luang-Prabang on October 13, another visitor had arrived in Vientiane: Aleksandr N. Abramov, the U.S.S.R.'s first ambassador to Laos, who immediately promised to replace the temporarily-absent American aid by an aid airlift of his own. He had a long talk with Souvanna Phouma, from which he emerged smiling. "I would have liked to meet Mr. Parsons," said Abramov, "but he left in such a hurry."

From then on, the die was cast. General Phoumi's troops began a long and tedious campaign to reach Vientiane, which finally was smothered under artillery fire by both sides (Kong-Lê's artillery being composed of Soviet-supplied guns), causing more than 500 civilian casualties as against 22 numbered Army casualties. On December 9, 1960, Souvanna Phouma fled to neighboring neutral Cambodia, while Kong-Lê's paratroops slowly retreated northward, making common cause with the Pathet Lao against Phoumi's forces.

"Polarization," for all practical purposes, had been a success. In the eyes of an editorial writer for *The New York Times*,

... the issue has been simplified by the fact that the forces of Captain Kong ... have made common cause with the pro-Communist Pathet Lao forces, making the formerly three-cornered civil

war a clear struggle between Communist and anti-Communist forces.²²

That judgment was somewhat premature. "Polarization" had not "simplified" the Laotian civil war—for it now was a civil war. It merely had *internationalized* it by making it the object of another direct contest of power between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Back To Geneva

From the viewpoint of the over-all power struggle, "polarization" as an element of policy was fully justifiable if it achieved its objectives, i.e., the complete destruction of the opposition in one swift blow, as was done by Khrushchev's tanks in Budapest. In the case of American support for native anti-Communist forces in Laos and Cuba, the United States shied away from the ultimate step—commitment of American troops—that would have made that policy successful.

In Laos, in any case, it was the Soviet Union which profited most heavily from the process. Polarization added Kong-Lê's paratroop regulars as well as some other Royal troops to the Pathet Lao, not to speak of several excellent airfields in the *Plaine des Jarres* which now became the focal point for a heavy Soviet arms build-up. It is unlikely that such an arms build-up could have taken place (or in any case so swiftly) had Kong-Lê's paratroops stayed on the non-Communist side. The fact that the overwhelming bulk of the Laotian army remained loyal to General Phoumi and the new Right-wing premier Prince Boun Oum changed the picture very little; in spite of heavy American aid including such modern weapons as helicopters and artillery, the regulars were driven to the wall in a series of swift Pathet Lao-Kong-Lê stabs. The cease-fire which followed on May 3, 1961, left in pro-Communist hands much of the Laotian hinterland outside the Mekong valley.

The 14-nation conference which opened at Geneva on May 16, 1961, left little room for Western optimism. Even prior to the conference's opening, the United States had been led, under the pressure of rapidly deteriorating events, to accept one by one every aspect of neutralization in Laos which it had fought so tenaciously since 1957: the return

(Continued on p. 27)

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *The New York Times*, October 17, 1960.

²² *Ibid.*, December 17, 1960.

This author raises the puzzling question: ". . . why a highly intelligent President and his able advisers involved the United States in a course of action against the Castro regime that was ill conceived and badly executed." He blames a misreading of history; and notes that "the heart of the political problem lies in the strong appeal of the Cuban type of popular authoritarian revolution, which we may call fidelismo for convenience, to the Latin American masses."

Yankeephobia: The United States and Latin America

By ARTHUR P. WHITAKER

Professor of Latin American History, University of Pennsylvania

AS THESE LINES are written at the beginning of October, 1961, Cuba is still as much the touchstone of United States' relations with Latin America at large as it was when the United States gave its blessing, and more, to the abortive invasion of that island last April. Cuba was certainly the touchstone then; otherwise the United States would hardly have risked souring all its Latin American relations by its unilateral support of the invasion.

That Cuba is still the touchstone seems equally clear in the light of the two major developments in Latin America since the April fiasco. At the Inter-American economic conference at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in August, the Cuban representative, "Che" Guevara, played—with notable success—a far more important role than he was entitled to by his little country's size and power. A few days later this same Guevara was decorated by President Janio

Quadros of Brazil, the giant country of Latin America; in the ensuing Brazilian crisis pro- and anti-Castro feeling again weighed heavily; and although Quadros resigned under pressure, his place was filled by another declared friend of Castro, Vice-President João Goulart.

Now that the dust of last April's fiasco has had time to settle, we are in a better position to appraise the Cuban problem that gave rise to it and to reconsider possible solutions. The following appraisal deals not with Cuba alone but rather with the significance of the Cuban problem for our whole Latin American policy. Also in so far as space permits, it places that problem in historical perspective—something that was obviously not done by the administration in Washington last April. Statesmanship requires a sense of history, which we are told President Kennedy has; but it also requires accurate knowledge, sound interpretation, and skill in projecting the results of the interplay between the ever-active historical forces of continuity and change.

To go no further back, since World War II the Latin American policy of the United States has been characterized by an ambiguity strikingly illustrated by its attitude towards Castro's Cuba. This ambiguity has its main source in the incompleteness of the American policy revolution of 1947, which has left us with an unresolved antithesis between the new "globalism" and the older American regionalism. On the one hand,

Arthur P. Whitaker has lectured at the University of San Marcos and the Catholic University, both in Lima, Peru, and at the National Institute of Colombia. His books include *The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline* and *The United States and Argentina*. His latest book, *Spain and Defense of the West*, was published last year by Harper & Brothers for the Council on Foreign Relations.

that revolution, in the words of Hans Morgenthau, marked "the permanent assumption by the United States of responsibilities beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere." On the other hand, in certain situations the United States has continued to cling to the historic "Western Hemisphere idea"; the idea of a closed hemisphere in which the United States and Latin America are bound together by a special relationship (normally a fraternal one) that sets them apart from the rest of the world dates from the early nineteenth century.

When such a situation arose with regard to Castro's Cuba, the United States insisted that it be dealt with in hemispheric terms. In other situations, however, pressures arising from its assumption of worldwide responsibilities have tended to make the United States disregard the special relationship when this was the basis of unwelcome Latin American claims upon it. At such times it has applied the same criteria to Latin America as to the rest of the world.

The best illustration is economic aid. So long as Washington cherished the illusion that Latin America was neither actually nor potentially a critical area in the cold war, the Latin Americans' share of American economic aid remained microscopic, and their complaints and aspirations in other respects went largely unheeded. Concluding that their relationship with the United States had become one not of special favor but of singular neglect, the Latin Americans developed a considerable reluctance to defer to the United States in deciding what cases called for hemispheric action; the case of Cuba is a shining example.

Latin American complaints multiplied after 1947 as a social ferment developed in that area through the conjuncture of a population explosion—the most violent in the world—with a revolution of rising expectations. Yet Washington continued to take the Latin Americans for granted and did little more than preach anti-communism and promote military defenses against a threat which most Latin Americans thought was economic and social, not military.

Shaken out of its inherited complacency by the anti-Nixon South American demonstrations in 1958 and by the open affiliation

of Fidel Castro's Cuban government with the Sino-Soviet bloc, the Eisenhower administration initiated three important new departures in Latin American policy. It joined the Latin Americans in setting up an Inter-American Development Bank, long desired by them and opposed by the United States. It planned the reversal of the United States' long-standing refusal to aid Latin American government-controlled enterprises in fields deemed by Washington appropriate to private enterprise, such as the Argentine, Bolivian, Brazilian, and Mexican oil monopolies. And it promised to provide \$500 million in support of its "Bogotá Plan," conditioned on self-help, for social reform in Latin America.

The Kennedy administration has continued and expanded these measures under its "Alliance for Progress" label. Its stand at the recent Punta del Este economic conference was an earnest of its good intentions. It remains to be seen whether such measures will be carried to the point of clearing up the long-standing ambiguity in United States policy and of repairing the damage it has caused in Latin America. Unfortunately, their effect was blunted in Latin America, and doubts about the true intent of the Latin American policy of the Kennedy administration were raised everywhere by the involvement of the United States in the abortive invasion of Cuba. This took place at a time when the echoes of the speech in which President Kennedy proposed the "Alliance for Progress" had hardly died down.

Cuban Invasion

Seldom if ever has so brief an episode brought into sharp focus so many fundamental issues of American policy, both at home and abroad, as did that Cuban invasion. The topics range from the nature of the cold war and how to wage it, through the questions of our respect for the sanctity of treaties, and the roles of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military, the press, radio, and television, to the future of our relations with Latin America and the rest of the world. It would be impossible to discuss all these topics here, but they should be kept in mind as a backdrop for what follows.

In future histories, the story of the United States' part in this invasion might well bear the title, "Too Many Westerns, or Nothing Succeeds Like Failure." The first part of this title would suggest the hypothesis that the plethora of "westerns" on our television screens both reflects and nourishes our historic national propensity for seeing foreign policy problems in military terms and for seeking solutions by "shooting it out" with the villain. What schoolboy has not heard of "Fifty-four forty or fight"? (Today, of course, we are more selective; few of us would take the initiative in shooting it out with the possessor of hydrogen bombs.) The second part of the above title would suggest that the failure of our Cuban venture last April may have been a success in the sense that it averted more serious consequences and led to a salutary, though painful, reappraisal of our policy and its methods and basic assumptions.

We must, of course, agree with the statement, made by President Kennedy at the time, that national security takes precedence over treaty obligations, and with the implication that the unilateral use of force may accordingly become necessary in such cases as that of Cuba. But this rule should be invoked only in a grave emergency and we have no reason to believe that such an emergency existed last April in the case of Cuba. We ought to keep some sense of proportion.

We must also, remembering history, beware of the "scrap of paper" illusion about treaty obligations. The Germany of 1914 suffered from this illusion when it invaded Belgium, whose neutrality it was pledged by treaty to respect. Far from being capricious, that violation was defended as essential to Germany's national security. Yet it is doubtful whether this line of reasoning was justified even in terms of "realism." At that time it was overwhelmingly rejected in the United States on legal and moral grounds.

The theme of the uses of history—and, conversely, of its misuse—enters into the story of the Cuban fiasco at yet another point. It forms an essential part of the answer of the otherwise puzzling question why a highly intelligent President and his able advisers involved the United States

in a course of action against the Castro regime that was ill conceived and badly executed.

The best answer—which, so far as I know, has not previously been given in print—is that President Kennedy and his advisers misread the history of a similar intervention by the United States in Guatemala in 1954. On that occasion, too, the United States operated through the Central Intelligence Agency against a Communist-infected regime, that of President Jacobo Arbenz, and an attack by a force of Guatemalan exiles was launched from a neighboring country. Because Arbenz was soon overthrown, the myth has become established in the United States that the operation was a great success; and belief in this myth encouraged a repetition of the formula against Castro.

Actually, however, the Guatemalan operation was not a success even in a military sense, and in a political and diplomatic sense it was a serious blunder. What overthrew Arbenz was his own army, which turned against him, not to join the invaders, but for reasons of its own. Politically and diplomatically the intervention in Guatemala was a blunder because it did more than anything else that had happened up to that time to fix in Latin American minds an image that had been taking shape ever since the death of Franklin Roosevelt—the image of the United States as at best indifferent to the rising tide of social reform and nationalism in Latin America, and as hostile to this tide when it conflicts with its own quest for wealth and power.

Yankeephobia

We in the United States know that this image of our country is a caricature. But it is widely accepted in Latin America as a living likeness. The consequences of its growing acceptance have been serious. They can be seen in the current growth of Latin American Yankeephobia and in the refusal of the governments representing most of the Latin American people to join us in imposing any sanctions on Castro's Cuba.

In 1960, Brazil and Argentina were apparently ready to join in action of some kind against Castro, but they cooled as the situation built up to another action of the

Guatemala type. Chile and Mexico have opposed such action all along; and these four countries not only contain two-thirds of Latin America's total population of nearly 200 million but are also among the most advanced in every way, and among the most democratic. If we can not get their co-operation, it is useless to talk about lining up Latin America against Castro.

Is this a counsel of despair? Immediately, not quite; for the long pull, not at all. Before we consider solutions, let us define the problem illustrated by the Cuban case, remembering that it is being discussed here from the point of view of the United States. Obviously, the problem is not one of Cuba alone, but of all Latin America. But the question remains whether the problem is primarily economic or military or political, or a mélange of all three.

As I see it, for the United States the problem is essentially political. This is certainly true of Cuba, which is the nub of the problem. Economically, while Castro has seriously injured some individual citizens and corporations of the United States, he has not caused even a slight tremor in the national economy. The military aspect of the problem is more serious but still not central. Although Sino-Soviet bloc arms and technicians have greatly strengthened Castro's regime, they have not made it, and almost certainly are not intended to make it, a direct military threat to the United States.

About the last thing the Kremlin and Peking want is to provoke a military assault by or from Cuba on the United States. The Castro regime, which would be annihilated, is too useful to them for other purposes. Chief among these is its use as a base for carrying on protracted warfare in the rest of Latin America. Protracted warfare takes various forms, including guerrilla operations. So far in Latin America there has been a heavy concentration on political warfare aimed at promoting communism, fidelismo, and "Yankeeophobia" and at disrupting the Organization of American States.

The heart of the political problem lies in the strong appeal of the Cuban type of popular authoritarian revolution, which we may call fidelismo for convenience, to the Latin American masses. They are suscept-

ible to its appeal because they have hitherto had little political experience; because their reading of history identifies representative, constitutional democracy with their exploitation by local oligarchies and foreign capitalist-imperialism; and because fidelismo promises them, however mendaciously, a quick issue out of their afflictions.

Whether or not it bears the label of fidelismo, this type of revolution has a stronger appeal for most Latin Americans than communism, which they recognize as alien and basically anti-nationalist—and nationalism has deep roots and great vitality in Latin America. True, the two forces may work together elsewhere as they have done in Cuba. Indeed, the promoters of fidelismo must be aware that in all probability it cannot succeed anywhere in Latin America without the Sino-Soviet bloc backing that has been its main prop in Cuba.

Nevertheless, they are ready to accept this backing since aid from some foreign source is indispensable and the only alternative source is the United States. Escape from "domination" by the latter is one of their chief declared objectives, and will remain so until the United States gives them a new and better image of itself. Castro has convinced many Latin Americans that for Cuba the formation of ties with Moscow and Peking has meant, not a change of masters or the absorption of Cuba by the Sino-Soviet bloc, but on the contrary the achievement of genuine independence. To drive this point home, his government recently took part not only in the Inter-American Conference at Punta del Este, but also in the conference of neutralist powers at Belgrade.

Solutions

The United States is under an enormous handicap in coping with these interrelated problems. The handicap is made up in part of Latin American grievances which long antedate the rise of communism as well as fidelismo. These were redressed only temporarily or in part by Franklin Roosevelt. From the close of World War II to 1960 the Latin American policy of the United States was, in the opinion of many Latin Americans, a compound of a negative political policy of anti-communism and an ortho-

dox and intolerant economic policy of free capitalist enterprise that smacked of intervention. This policy also retarded the rate of economic development and strengthened the very forces of military dictatorship and oligarchy against which the growing social ferment in Latin America has been directed.

Where do we go from here? The long-range "Alliance for Progress" label dominates present policy: is this the right course to take? Some thoughtful commentators doubt it. They warn that the whole American program of foreign aid rests on assumptions of very questionable validity, including the assumptions that such aid will make friends for us and that it will stimulate a healthy economic development, bring about a general rise in living standards, and promote the growth of stable, democratic societies.

While I share these doubts about the method, I nevertheless think we must employ it. We may fail if we do, but, in the present state of Latin America and the world at large, we are almost certain to fail if we do not. We have advantages as well as disadvantages, and friends as well as enemies, in Latin America. And this is the best way to build up our strength there.

Many other problems, and some hard choices, face the Kennedy administration as it reorients itself after the Cuban fiasco of last April. One is whether the United States should continue, increase, or terminate its military assistance to Latin America, and for what purposes, if any, such aid should be given. Only two general observations can be made here about this complex and difficult problem. The first is that, while a reduction of Latin American armed forces and their budgets is desirable, the United States ought not to encourage total disarmament there; it must not become the policeman of the Western Hemisphere. This leads to the second point, which is that the United States will probably have to provide some military aid. This should be granted or withheld and otherwise tailored to fit the situation in each of the highly diversified countries of Latin America.

Another question is what to do about the Organization of American States. Some extremists in the United States favor abolish-

ing it or pulling out of it because it has failed so lamentably to meet the challenge of Castro's Cuba. I dissent, for that failure was partly our own fault and in any case a useful instrument ought not to be abandoned merely because it is not perfect. However unsatisfactory it has proved so far, it is at least better than the United Nations; the Soviet veto in the Security Council renders this body wholly unacceptable as an instrumentality for handling American regional affairs.

Finally, and much the most important of all, is the fundamental question raised by the recent resurgence in this country of the demand for unilateral military action against the Castro regime. Such action now would be a blunder of the highest magnitude. It is not justified either by the present threat from Cuba or by the present prospects of the Castro regime, which, I am confident, will either shed its Communist affiliations or disappear. There is no reason to assume that we must either blast Castro out now or else tamely submit to the permanent presence of a Communist power on our doorstep.

On the other hand, armed intervention by the United States in Cuba under present circumstances would wreck the O.A.S., poison our relations with the rest of Latin America for decades to come, and destroy the credibility of our chosen role in world affairs as a champion of law, order, and the sanctity of treaties.

A lot of ink has been spilled over this question since the fiasco of last April, to confuse the issue. But in fact the choice before us is simple: is the United States going to continue to conduct its relations with Latin America on the basis of the voluntary association laboriously built up during the past three generations? Or is it going to exchange this for a hemispheric regime of force?

Once started in the case of Cuba, the logic of a go-it-alone, damn-the-treaties process would not stop with Cuba, or even with Latin America at large. The result would be a policy revolution far more sweeping than the one of 1947, and as bad as that one was good—and all because of Castro's Cuba. As I said before, we need a sense of proportion and a true sense of history.

Writing of United States' policies toward West Europe and the continuing crisis over Berlin, this specialist warns that any weakening of "Nato's central front would create a dangerous power vacuum which could easily be filled with Soviet preponderance in conventional arms." Thus, "any substantial retreat in that quarter [Berlin] would mean loss of confidence on the part of Germans and many other Europeans in the United States' will to defend freedom in Western Europe."

The Berlin Crisis and Atlantic Unity

By CARL G. ANTHON

Chairman of the History Department, American University

IN EUROPE as well as in this country the advent of the Kennedy administration was hailed with great expectations. The evident inactivity of the Eisenhower regime—"hibernation" one French paper called it—(due in part to the constitutional condemnation to impotence of any American administration in its last two years) caused considerable impatience on the part of certain European statesmen. In fact, it was the spectacle of America's apparent abdication from leadership in the Atlantic alliance that induced General de Gaulle the year before to elaborate his Grand Design of a European confederation. This was to act as a Third Force between the two superpowers, the United States and the U.S.S.R. In continental Europe, there was widespread belief that American foreign policy lacked vigor, initiative and realism, and that it was ill-suited to meet the relentless and singleminded challenge from the Kremlin.


It was therefore with a deep sense of relief

Carl G. Anthon has taught at several colleges and universities, including the American University of Beirut (1955-1958). He has served as cultural officer for the U.S. High Commissioner in Berlin (1950-1952) and as Executive Secretary of the Fulbright Commission in Bonn (1958-1960).

and gratification that European leaders received the first indications of the Kennedy administration's plans and policies. They noted the earnest tone, the frank and sober appraisal of the "state of the Union" in John F. Kennedy's address to Congress on January 29. They hailed his early decision for a military buildup, specifically of our Polaris submarine program, our air- and sealift capacity, and our entire missiles program. No doubt they agreed with his disarming prediction that "the news will be worse before it is better," but they were impressed with his determination, his energy, his sound judgment in the appointment of intelligent, knowledgeable cabinet officers and personal advisers ("veritable mathematicians of politics," wrote one French commentator). The young President's eloquence was welcomed by fastidious Europeans, and it is perhaps just as well they did not hear our poetic sage, Robert Frost, tell Kennedy to be "more Irish than Harvard." In short, a fresh, invigorating breeze from across the Atlantic seemed to initiate a "new era" auguring well for the trials and crises that were sure to be ahead.

Specifically, the new Administration was expected to find a new, more dynamic approach to the East-West stalemate in Europe. Kennedy's now classic words in the Inaugural Address, "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate," were interpreted as readiness to review past

MAP OF GERMANY



U.S. Department of State Publication 7257, August, 1961

policies and negotiations with a view of obtaining a genuine *modus vivendi* with Moscow. At the same time, Kennedy's early military measures showed that he meant to negotiate from strength. While there might have been some apprehensions regarding possible concessions which the new Administration might be willing to consider, there was little doubt that there would be no basic change in America's policies toward Western Europe, and toward Nato in particular.

On the contrary, Kennedy's criticism of Nato as "weakened by economic rivalry [a hint at the Six vs. the Seven] and partially eroded by national interest" [i.e. de Gaulle's tendency to go it alone] indicated a determination to strengthen Nato as the indispensable shield of the Free World. Finally, Kennedy's repeated and unequivocal statements in his press conferences regarding the freedom of Berlin reassured even the staunchest advocates of unyielding resistance to Soviet demands.

People did not have to wait long for Kennedy's prediction of worsening news to come true. The Cuban fiasco, the spectacular orbital journey of the Soviet astronaut, Yuri Gagarin, the failure of the Geneva disarmament talks, the Laos imbroglio, to say nothing of a host of domestic problems, tormented the new Administration with relentless persistence during its first five months. The response of the Kennedy administration to these challenges, in the eyes of the outside observer, did not differ markedly from that of the previous regime. Again there was irresolution, conflicting opinion among the President's advisers, embarrassing publicity and humiliation—all too familiar experiences in earlier years.

The result was growing disillusionment in Europe as well as at home and frustration over the evident absence of leadership in America at a time when another crisis was to break out over Berlin. As Philippe Ben of *Le Monde* (July 28, 1961) put it, two myths were shattered during those first months: first, that the President was surrounded by supermen who would avoid the mistakes of the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower administrations; and secondly, that there existed some magic methods or formulae the application of which in a few swift, bold actions could radically alter the world.

The Berlin Crisis

The East-West controversy over Berlin, initiated by Khrushchev's six-month's ultimatum of November 27, 1958, was briefly suspended by Moscow to allow for presidential elections in the United States and the working in of a new team. Khrushchev hoped the new Administration would be more tractable than the Eisenhower-Dulles team of old. To work out concerted plans for negotiations over Berlin, close contacts were established at once between the new Administration and the European governments. Averell Harriman, the indispensable special emissary of presidents, was dispatched to London, Paris, Bonn and Rome, followed by Dean Acheson, the vigorous champion of a revitalized Nato. Macmillan, Adenauer, Fanfani and other political leaders came to Washington to establish close rapport.

Shortly afterwards, at a meeting of Nato foreign ministers in Oslo, May 8-10, Secretary of State Dean Rusk presented the views and plans of the Kennedy administration. These included a stronger, reactivated military and political alliance, a vigorous buildup of both conventional and nuclear arms, and closer political collaboration among the members. The Oslo meeting also produced a clear-cut affirmation of Atlantic solidarity with regard to the freedom of West Berlin and a just solution of the German question on the basis of self-determination. This firm reiteration of the Nato declaration of December 16, 1958, together with the United States offer to make five Polaris submarines available to Nato (not yet accepted), was well timed to warn Khrushchev lest he be encouraged by events in Cuba and Laos to undertake adventures against Berlin.

In view of the serious loss of prestige sustained by President Kennedy by springtime, the announcement of his forthcoming meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna was regarded with considerable misgiving by the European press. It seemed inconsistent, to say the least, with Rusk's earlier critical references to ill-prepared summit meetings and "contact diplomacy." It was feared the Russian dictator would wrap the young, inexperienced President around his little finger. Actually, the Vienna meeting, with the stop-over visits in Paris and London, was judged by most European commentators to have

been useful though unproductive. Certainly, the contact established with General de Gaulle and the opportunity to iron out some misunderstandings about Nato were all to the good. The gallant general "liked the young man very well" and his charming, young wife even better, a feeling assuredly shared by most Frenchmen, Austrians, and Englishmen who thronged to greet the Kennedy couple.

The Vienna talks of the two world leaders, in a charming, gay Old World background, was a sobering experience, at least for Mr. Kennedy. The "most somber talks," according to Kennedy, concerned Berlin and Germany. It was clear that Khrushchev had not budged an inch on his earlier demands for a free, demilitarized city of West Berlin and a speedy peace treaty with Germany (or separate peace treaties with the two Germanies, involving of course, recognition of the East German regime). These demands were spelled out in a Soviet aide-memoire which was handed to President Kennedy in Vienna. Among other things, this document stipulated that in the event of a separate peace treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the German Democratic Republic the occupation regime in West Berlin would be automatically extinguished.

If Khrushchev had meant to intimidate and blackmail the President into concessions on Berlin the effect produced was exactly the opposite. In the agonizing weeks following the Vienna meeting Kennedy suffered from depression as well as from backache. The President and his advisers emerged from the blow with renewed vigor and determination to rally the country to the challenge. Berlin now became priority Number One. "We cannot and we will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin," said the President in his television address to the nation on July 25, "either gradually or by force. For the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of Western Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the entire Free World."

To back up this pledge, President Kennedy announced a series of measures de-

signed to bolster this country's military establishment. He asked Congress for an additional \$3,247,000,000 for the Armed Forces, making a total increase of \$6 billion since January and a total defense budget of \$47.5 billion for 1961-1962. The Army was to be increased from 875,000 to approximately one million men, with commensurate increases for the Navy and Air Force. Half of the extra funds were to be used for the procurement of conventional arms and ammunition. Similar steps for common defense were to be taken by our Nato allies.

While this country was thus regaining its posture, with the people fully backing the President and his Berlin program, events moved more swiftly in that outpost of the Free World than even Khrushchev could have envisaged. The foreknowledge of a vital change in the status of Berlin seized the people of East Germany with panic. Thousands of them took flight to West Berlin during the months of July and early August while the door to freedom was still open. East Germany, from which nearly four million people had fled since 1945, was in danger of becoming depopulated. In the first 12 days of August alone some 22,000 refugees reached West Berlin.

On August 13, therefore, with the backing of the Warsaw Pact nations, the Communist regime of Walter Ulbricht took the drastic step of sealing off East Berlin from the Western sectors with barbed wire and cement blocks. Thus, the escape hatch was closed to millions of East Germans. East Germany was turned into one vast prison. For the Communists, this was an embarrassing admission of failure and tyranny, a situation that was exploited to the hilt by Western propaganda agencies for the benefit of the uncommitted nations (then meeting in Belgrade). But this was scant consolation for the losses suffered by the West.

On August 13, the last vestiges of Berlin's four-power status (whittled down consistently since 1948) were extinguished by unilateral violence. This ended the remaining bonds that had existed between East and West Germans despite the Iron Curtain. It is probably correct to say¹ that by the events of August 13 the physical split of Germany had become final and irreparable for the foreseeable future. As if this were not

¹ As did Fritz R. Allemann, the incisive editor of *Der Monat*, Sept. 1961.

enough, the West suffered another moral defeat through the irresolution and inaction that followed, although Willy Brandt, Berlin's gallant mayor, wrote a personal appeal to President Kennedy for immediate and effective action. No sanctions, no counter-measures of any kind were imposed on the East German regime. An economic embargo such as had been effective in breaking the Soviet blockade of Berlin in 1949 was rejected by the Allies lest it would provoke the Communists into subjecting West Berlin to a total blockade. The economic weapon was to be held in reserve for graver infractions of our rights in West Berlin. Restrictions on travel for East German officials in Western countries were likewise rejected because they would seem too trivial.

United States' inactivity in particular was strongly criticized and misunderstood, not only in Germany but also in France and some of the smaller countries. There was much angry mumbling about another "Munich" and one group of students from the University of Bonn sent a package containing an umbrella, the symbol of the Munich deal, to President Kennedy. Many people failed to appreciate that the American commitment extended only to West Berlin and any measures to break the prison wall on East German soil would have met with dismay in certain Nato countries, notably England. Nor was the West in a position to fight a non-nuclear war at this time, for the plans to build up conventional arms would take several years.

Western Inaction

Whether or not Western inaction was justified, the events of August 13 produced a deep shock and undermined the confidence of Berliners in United States' ability or even willingness to defend Western rights and interests. The mood of Berliners was reflected in such headlines as "Berlin expects more than words," and "One cannot stop tanks with paper!" To counteract this morale crisis, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson and former military governor General Lucius D. Clay—the latter as President's personal emissary—were quickly dispatched to West Berlin. They were received with almost frenetic enthusiasm by the outgoing Berliners. The further dispatch of 1,500 addi-

tional American troops over the Autobahn (through East German territory) to Berlin, signifying United States' determination to defend the freedom of West Berlin, helped to restore confidence to a certain extent.

But as an outpost of the free world, as a haven for refugees and for visitors from East Germany starved for a breath of freedom, and as future capital of a reunited Germany, Berlin has lost most of its strength and function. Whether or not the city will wither away politically, economically, culturally, as some commentators hold, depends to a large extent on effective help from West Germany and the Allies. Unfortunately, the positive concern of West Germans for Berlin and their compatriots behind the Iron Curtain leaves much to be desired.

Despite the brutal slap in the face of August 13 and the continued bellicosity of Khrushchev, Washington was more willing than ever to negotiate although it would obviously be negotiating under duress. Certain voices and rumors, some official some unofficial, were heard in those days which gave little assurance of a firm attitude. General Clay's careless and apparently unauthorized hints during a cocktail reception of newsmen, suggesting a more "realistic" acceptance of the two Germanies, seemed to indicate an impending switch in basic American foreign policy. Mayor Brandt's remark, "We are poorer of some hopes but also, possibly for our benefit, freed of some illusions," reflects perhaps the growing resignation and skepticism of Berliners. Earlier, even before August 13, Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on a "Meet the Press" program, July 30, had suggested that the West might offer (as a minor concession) to close the doors to the flow of refugees. "I don't understand," said the influential senator, "why the East Germans don't close their border because I think they have a right to close it."

This rather careless opinion, completely ignoring the legal four-power status of Berlin, elicited a strong, angry reaction among Germans who congratulated themselves that Fulbright did not become Secretary of State in the Kennedy cabinet. To *Die Welt* (Hamburg) it represented a virtual invitation to Moscow to demand the complete

sealing off of West Berlin in future negotiations. And, in fact, the Senator's remarks were gleefully picked up by the Communist radio in East Berlin to demonstrate the alleged support and understanding on the part of certain "progressive" American political leaders for the measures taken by the Ulbricht police state on August 13. That same Fulbright, however, appeared as a champion of a "concert of free nations," of the political union of the Atlantic community, in his article for *Foreign Affairs* (October, 1961). This seeming inconsistency not only on the part of Fulbright, but also of other voluble, travelling senators, an inevitable phenomenon in the open American society, is often difficult for Europeans to comprehend.

"Negotiables"

What is the official view in Washington concerning concessions? None have been stated so far. But it is not difficult to extract from the rather bitter reactions in Bonn and Paris (who are actually opposed to negotiations at this juncture because in their view there is nothing to negotiate) what is crystallizing out of inter-allied conferences and the Rusk-Gromyko talks. Among the negotiables from the American point of view: a. some kind of *de facto* recognition of the puppet regime in East Germany which would conceivably act as "agent" for the Soviets in controlling Allied traffic to and from Berlin; b. some token modification in the status of West Berlin which might "remove any actual irritants" in that city (the words are Kennedy's but the idea was already worked out by the late John Foster Dulles); c. recognition of the Oder-Neisse line; and possibly, d. some form of disengagement whereby nuclear weapons would be withheld from the German army (supposedly to meet the security requirements of East Europeans) and possibly even nuclear disengagement in both East and West Germany. Non-negotiables are: the freedom of West Berlin, free access for Germans as well as Allies, economic and political viability of the city with continued ties with the German Federal Republic.

The government of Konrad Adenauer (who was recently reelected for the fourth

time as chancellor, but on a more tenuous power basis) is strenuously objecting to any concessions which would end reunification of Germany as a basic policy of the Allies. As Ambassador Wilhelm Grewe pointed out in his television interview on October 8, 1961 (causing some dismay because of his frankness), "a common policy for reunification of Germany and non-recognition of a separate second German state, the settlement of the frontier question only within the framework of a peace settlement, and Germany's position as an equal ally within Nato" were all conditions for Germany's entry into the Nato alliance in 1954.

This attitude on the part of Bonn does not necessarily mean indulgence in dreams and illusions, as Walter Lippmann and other observers have suggested, for Bonn as well as the Allied governments know full well that reunification cannot be achieved in the foreseeable future (leaving apart public opinion in Allied countries which is largely indifferent to reunification). It means rather that reunification as a long-term objective represents an asset, a force, that should not lightly be surrendered by the West, at last not without a commensurate *quid pro quo*. No such *quid pro quo* is in sight. That is the trouble, Adenauer and de Gaulle would say, with the whole package of proffered concessions. The renewed assurance of free access to West Berlin would merely confirm something the West already has and would fight for if denied. Hence the West would really be negotiating on the basis of Khrushchev's offer as characterized by President Kennedy in his speech of July 25, "What's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable." In other words, a whole basketful of concessions with nothing in return, and even this deal Khrushchev has not yet deigned to consider.

The Germans also firmly oppose any suggestion of nuclear disarmament if limited to Germany. It would mean, they say, a discrimination against them as an equal Nato partner and would render the German military contribution totally ineffective. For in the present military constellation in Europe, the thinning out of Nato's central front would create a dangerous power vacuum which could easily be filled with Soviet preponderance in conventional arms.

A nuclear disarmament scheme in central Europe would be sheer "insanity," according to German Defense Minister Franz Joseph Strauss, as long as and until Nato achieves an adequate counterpoise to the Soviets in conventional arms. And even then, no disengagement plan would be acceptable which would tend to weaken the United States commitment in Europe.

Here we come to the crux of the Berlin crisis. For that crisis is not limited to Berlin. Any substantial retreat in that quarter would mean loss of confidence on the part of Germans and many other Europeans in the United States' will to defend freedom in Western Europe. This in turn would encourage neutralism in West Germany (and other areas) which would seek some kind of accommodation (ghost of Rapallo!) with the Soviets. The Free Democrats, the partners in Adenauer's new, precarious coalition cabinet, have strong tendencies in this direction. A neutralist policy would take the life out of Nato and would result in the breakup of the Western alliance, and this—not merely the neutralization of West Berlin—is the real objective of Moscow.

The dangers inherent in the present road to negotiations and concessions are therefore real and profoundly disturbing. Some European skeptics have already resigned themselves to another inevitable retreat. General de Gaulle's attitude is perhaps typical: "I have very little hope left," he said on September 25, "that the status quo [in Berlin] will be maintained in view of the policy of our allies—particularly of our American allies. . . . Perhaps it will end with a new Western retreat. France will not participate in it." Prime Minister Macmillan, on the other hand, supports Washington's efforts to seek a way out of the crisis through negotiations, at the same time vigorously reaffirming his solidarity with his allies concerning the non-negotiables in West Berlin. Similarly, Premier Fanfani of Italy, who visited Khrushchev in Moscow during the summer and who was admittedly impatient with some of his Western colleagues for not paying sufficient heed to his advice urging East-West negotiations, supports the Anglo-American camp.

Fortunately, the prospect is not just one

of retreat. The readiness for negotiations is paralleled by military and diplomatic measures designed to strengthen the basis for such negotiations. The United States is sending 40,000 additional troops to Western Europe, most of which are to strengthen Nato's central defense front. Under Washington's leadership and pressure, other Nato partners are taking steps to increase their military contributions. West Germany is extending the term of training of its draftees from 12 to 18 months (all the Nato states except Luxembourg have longer training periods than 12 months). France has recalled two divisions from Algeria to bolster up her two divisions in West Germany, and there are indications that General de Gaulle is modifying his non-cooperative attitude to Nato which had prompted his withdrawal of the French navy from Nato command and his refusal to permit the storage of United States nuclear warheads on French soil.

Military Strength

In accordance with a new agreement last summer, French troops in West Germany are being trained in the use of American-owned atomic weapons. Britain is taking comparable steps to strengthen its army and air units. The over-all plan is to bring up Nato's army from the present 22 divisions on the Center to about 30 divisions by early 1962. President Kennedy's decision, influenced by General Maxwell D. Taylor, to achieve a better balance between conventional and nuclear forces, is designed to give the West a wider choice between capitulation and nuclear retaliation and thus greater flexibility in dealing with Communist aggression.

There is another ray of hope in this somber situation. The very pressure of Moscow has accelerated the most significant force in European history—the movement toward European unification. The decision of the British government last July to apply for full membership in the European Economic Community was made under the impact both of an economic depression at home and the sinister threat from Soviet Russia. It is likely that the other members of E.F.T.A. will also seek membership or association with E.E.C., thus vastly increasing that

community's market and economic potential. This development, of course, had the blessing of the United States which had been encouraging European integration all along and which was now studying plans for the "giant step" of becoming associated with E.E.C. by means of "across the board" tariff agreements. The E.E.C., meanwhile, had prospered (five to six per cent economic growth per annum or almost twice that of United States) and gone forward several strides toward integration. At the E.E.C. summit meeting in Bad Godesberg, Germany, last July, a committee was appointed to draw up statutes for closer political cooperation. The executive organs of the three main European communities, E.E.C., Euratom, and European Coal and Steel Community, are to be merged and closer

collaboration with the European parliament in Strasbourg is to be achieved.

The plan for a European university in Florence was dropped (owing to the opposition of the German local ministers of culture) in favor of a new Italian university in Florence to be supported by financial contributions and scientific experts from the E.E.C. countries. Although the goal of a United States of Europe is still a long way off, it is entirely possible that renewed Soviet pressure will give greater impetus to the modern Grand Design that may bring us out of the East-West stalemate in an entirely unexpected manner. In that case it is the Communists we have to thank for a rejuvenation of Europe and the Free World, thus proving old Hegel's dictum that Good can only come from the Bad.

(Continued from p. 14)

of the Indian-Polish-Canadian International Control Commission (I.C.C.); the withdrawal of all American military advisers; the inclusion of Pathet Lao elements in the Laotian government, administration and armed forces; the acceptance by Laos of Soviet bloc aid and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Laos and Bloc countries; and—finally—the return of Souvanna Phouma to power. And this Souvanna Phouma was thoroughly soured on the United States and at least in good part a prisoner of his own Left wing when he again accepted the Laotian premiership on October 8, 1961.

Conclusions

Laos is located in a part of Asia farthest removed from American centers of strength and closest to Communist zones of interest. Endowed with little that would make for a viable state even in the absence of a direct Communist threat, Laos was clearly not ideally suited for a policy that would sooner or later bring about a direct test of strength between the two power blocs.

There exist several such situations along the rim of the Soviet heartland: Finland and Austria come particularly to mind, although Afghanistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan and Burma are not at all excluded from the com-

parison. Finland, with its three million people spread thinly at the very front door of the U.S.S.R. and a record of three wars (1919, 1939, 1941–1944) with its mighty neighbor, is now totally defenseless against Soviet aggression. Any chances of the West coming to its succor are absolutely nil. Locked up in the Baltic, Finland survives as an independent and democratic state and, like Austria, is a member of the European Free Trade Area.

Austria is neutral by virtue of the State Treaty of 1955 signed by the United States, the U.S.S.R., Britain and France. Its army is equipped with American tanks, British rifles and Czech rocket-launchers. Yet had Austria, defenseless as it is, been as "neutral" during the Hungarian rebellion of 1956 as the Swiss during World War II, who (as this writer personally knows from his wartime French Resistance days in Savoy) did not hesitate to shoot at anti-Nazi refugees trying to cross over, then beyond a doubt only a handful of Hungarian freedom fighters would ever have made good their escape.

In other words, there are nuances to neutrality. Beyond a doubt one could have been found for Laos that would have suited the West a great deal better than what seemed to be developing late in 1961. Now the choice is no longer the West's alone.

Scoring the "effect of discrimination against minorities on American foreign policy," this specialist notes that "many American Negroes believe that they hold a higher mortgage note on Kennedy than they did on Eisenhower. Hence, the nexus between race relations in the United States and America's African policies has become more taut since January 20, 1961."

Discrimination: Weakness of Our African Policy

By RAYFORD W. LOGAN
Professor of History, Howard University

PRESIDENT KENNEDY's policies *vis-à-vis* African nationalism and Pan Africanism, like those of President Eisenhower, are dictated in large measure by the world-wide responsibilities of the United States as the most powerful member of the Western Powers. Eisenhower found it difficult to walk a tightrope without falling into one pit labelled "Alienation of America's Allies" or into another pit labelled "Alienation of the New African Nations." Other articles in this issue reveal that Kennedy's balancing act requires even more consummate skill. The fact that he has been President for only a few months justifies an analysis of his dilemma rather than firm conclusions about it.

Kennedy inherited most of his problems, including those inherent in the admission to the United Nations of 16 new African nations,¹ from the Eisenhower administration. But many American Negroes believe that they hold a higher mortgage note on

Kennedy than they did on Eisenhower. Hence, the nexus between race relations in the United States and America's African policies has become more taut since January 20, 1961.

Former Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson recognized the importance of the effect of discrimination against minorities on American foreign policy long before the emergence of the African nations. He wrote on May 8, 1946: "The existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries." Although foreign newspapers and spokesmen frequently exaggerated the extent of the discrimination, their criticisms were often accurate. The Department of State therefore hoped that there would be "continued and increased effectiveness of public and private efforts to do away with these discriminations."² Acheson did not mention Negroes specifically. The fact, however, that he addressed his letter to the Fair Employment Practices Committee revealed his special concern about discrimination against Negroes.

Public and private efforts had, indeed, reduced the scope of discrimination and segregation long before 1946. Russian criticism after the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947 accelerated these efforts.³ A less well-known

Rayford W. Logan, head of the history department at Howard University, has studied African affairs for over 30 years. As a Fulbright Research Fellow, he did research in Paris on the French administration of overseas territories. His books include *The African Mandates in World Politics* and *The Negro and the Post-War World*.

¹ The admission of the seventeenth, Sierra Leone, appears not to have aggravated Kennedy's dilemma.

² *To Secure These Rights* (Washington, 1947), p. 146.

³ For a brief treatment, see this writer's *The Negro in the United States: A Brief History* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1957).

fact is that French and British criticism—despite racial discrimination and segregation in their overseas territories and colonies—also caused concern in the State Department. In 1957, when Ghana became the “first”⁴ black African colony to gain independence, the struggle for equal rights for Negroes gained new dimensions and greater intensity.

The United States Congress in that same year passed its first civil rights law in 82 years. It enacted a second civil rights law in 1960. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court is almost unremittingly striking down various maneuvers by which most Southern and a few Northern states have sought to circumvent its decisions. President Eisenhower generally took a neutral position with respect to these decisions, except in his dramatic use of federal troops to compel the admission of a few Negro students to Central High School, Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957. But Eisenhower did continue the Roosevelt and Truman policies of seeking by executive order to narrow the scope of discrimination and segregation.

Since many African and American Negroes, in particular, link United States policy toward Africa with the treatment of Negroes in the United States, they keep a watchful eye on the Kennedy administration's civil rights record. Has this record improved United States relations with the new so-called black nations of Africa?

Discrimination at Home

On balance, this record is slightly better than that of the Eisenhower administration. Kennedy's Department of Justice has acted more vigorously than did Eisenhower's. But President Kennedy failed to obtain passage of that part of a law for federal aid to public schools that would have been most beneficial to Negro students. He failed to prevail upon the Senate to make it easier to put an end to filibusters. Political pundits in Washington predict that neither measure will be adopted in 1962. Whatever the reasons may be, President Kennedy refused

to seek adoption of a stronger civil rights law.

Most Africans may not be able to make a valid comparison between the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations. But daily newspapers and the Negro press have highlighted Kennedy's low civil-rights “batting average” against his better record with other legislation, especially if it were a carry-over from his predecessor's administration.

African and American Negroes do not need to read newspapers to be aware of discrimination in public housing, notably in New York and Washington. Angier Biddle Duke, Chief of Protocol, and his Deputy Chief, Pedro Sanjuan, have personally sought to assist African diplomats to find suitable chanceries and housing for themselves and members of their staff. They have achieved only limited success. Although the problem is not entirely racial,⁵ the racial factor predominates.

African and American Negroes had valid reasons for expecting Kennedy to issue an executive order prohibiting segregation or discrimination in housing projects which receive federal funds. On August 9, 1960, when Kennedy was campaigning for the presidency, he asked President Eisenhower to issue such an order and promised: “If he does not do it, a new Democratic administration will.” On October 12, 1960, Kennedy deplored Eisenhower's inaction and insisted that “one stroke of the pen would have worked wonders for millions of Negroes who want their children to grow up in decency.”⁶ When this article went to press, President Kennedy had not yet wielded that stroke of the pen.

Denial of service in public places has further irked African diplomats and other high-ranking officials. The first well publicized incident in recent years occurred on October 7, 1957, at Dover, Delaware. A waitress in a Howard Johnson restaurant served K. A. Gbedemah, Ghana's Minister of Finance, and his secretary orange juice in paper containers and told them they would have to drink it outside. Even after Gbedemah had shown the manager his credentials, the Minister was not permitted to drink his orange juice inside the restaurant. The State Department issued an official apology and President Eisenhower

⁴ Sudan, a part of the former Anglo-Egyptian Condominium which is also “black,” became independent on January 1, 1956. But Ghana is still generally referred to as the first independent black African nation.

⁵ *Washington Star*, September 3, 1961, pp. A-1, A-6.

⁶ *Ibid.*, September 27, 1961, p. A-2.

immediately invited Gbedemah to breakfast at the White House.⁷

The situation has worsened since late 1960 because of the much larger number of African diplomats who travel by automobile between New York and Washington. That part of United States Route 40 which runs through Maryland became in particular a symbol of shame to many Americans and of humiliation to Africans. The Kennedy administration has expressed official apologies and regrets. It has also vigorously sought to prevail upon state officials and restaurant owners in Maryland and elsewhere to understand how much such incidents damage the democratic image of the United States abroad. Not even the Administration's participants in these negotiations know how fruitful they will be. The Administration must continue, therefore, to explain to Africans and others the realities of American politics and the constitutional complexities of our federal form of government.

Many African diplomats and their staffs, cabinet ministers visiting the United States and students residing in the United States include Kennedy's appointment policies in their microscopic examination of flaws in the American democratic armature. They give Kennedy credit for several important "Negro firsts": an Ambassador to a European nation;⁸ the Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency; a Federal District Judge in the United States; a White House Press Associate Secretary; a Commissioner of the District of Columbia; a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs.

Negroes in Government

Many Africans also recognize the symbolic importance of Kennedy's selection of Thurgood Marshall for the second nomination of a Negro to a Circuit Court judgeship.⁹ Marshall, the Director and Counsel of the Legal and Educational Fund of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People, is known as "Mr. Civil Rights" because of the many successful cases which he has argued before the United States Supreme Court and lower courts. President Kennedy has also followed the Eisenhower policy of appointing a competent Negro as Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs and another as a member of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia. Few Africans know that some American Negroes have declined important appointments at home and abroad because of dedication to positions which they have held for many years.

On the other hand, Africans are aware of job discrimination against Negroes, especially in the State Department. On their visits to the Department, these Africans see a disproportionately large number of Negro custodians, waiters and waitresses, messengers and clerks. They see a very small number of Negroes in the higher grades. Some of these Africans express pleasure on being greeted by O. Rudolph Aggrey, a career Foreign Service Officer, a Deputy Public Affairs Advisor in the Bureau of African Affairs. Aggrey has accompanied Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams on trips to Africa.

Negro employees in the State Department have declared that they do not know of a Negro who holds a position in the formulation of African or other policies in the State Department. The Kennedy administration is paying a high price for the discrimination against Negroes in the State Department and in the Foreign Service that began long before the Eisenhower administration and that continued, despite minor amelioration, during his Administration. The Foreign Service examination is stiff, but some Negroes who might have passed it did not take it because they believed, and rightly so, that their race militated against their appointment and promotion and, again rightly so, that if appointed they would be assigned to hardship posts. Consequently, efforts made during the Eisenhower administration to encourage competent Negroes to take the Foreign Service examination proved to be almost fruitless.

On August 16, 1961, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration in the Department of State met with 40 Negro leaders to

⁷ *The New York Times*, October 9, 1957, p. 20.

⁸ President Eisenhower had appointed this Ambassador, Clifton R. Wharton, as the first Negro Minister Plenipotentiary to a European nation in 1958.

⁹ President Truman had appointed the first, William H. Hastie, in 1949.

discuss a campaign to make it known that the Department sought qualified Negroes for the Foreign Service. Secretary of State Dean Rusk told these leaders: "We are determined to do everything that we can to insure that discrimination is not practiced in the State Department, and that we open up the channels of opportunity to all of our American citizens."¹⁰ Without doubting the sincerity of Secretary Rusk, few Negroes in the State Department believe that he has time to check whether his subordinates will implement his determination.

The Library of Congress probably provides the second best evidence of the ineffectiveness of the Kennedy administration's vigorous efforts to appoint and upgrade competent Negroes. African students see at the Library very few Negroes in professional jobs. These students, more outspoken than African diplomats, twit Americans about the apparent discrimination. The facts that Kennedy has put increasing pressure on the personnel chiefs and that a few Negroes have out-of-sight professional positions do not lessen the acidulous comments by many African students.

I believe that Kennedy's sincere determination will gradually break down resistance not only in the State Department and in the Library of Congress but in other departments and agencies of the federal government. But at the end of 1961, African diplomats, students and visitors saw few signs of a substantial breakthrough of the color line on the middle and upper levels of federal employment.

A delicate and highly controversial subject involves Kennedy's appointments of diplomats to African nations. President Eisenhower appointed one noncareer Negro as ambassador to Guinea and President Kennedy has appointed another to the Republic of the Niger. The latter, an eminent bilingual authority on French African literature and a personal friend of many French African statesmen, would add distinction to an American Embassy anywhere. He and his charming bilingual wife have already won the affection of the government and people of the Republic of the Niger, particularly because of their personal interest in

the welfare of the people. A Negro Foreign Service Officer, Class 1 (the highest grade), is Minister Counselor in the Ivory Coast.

When this article went to press, these were the only high-ranking Negro diplomats in Africa. Some Americans—white as well as Negro—have accused African Presidents and Prime Ministers of resisting the appointment of Negro diplomats. I do not know to what extent the allegations have validity. If they have validity, President Kennedy is seeking to improve relations with these nations by conforming to their wishes. At the same time, however—if the allegations are founded in fact—he is condoning a reverse kind of racial prejudice while he is seeking to reduce race discrimination in the United States.

Whatever the facts may be, I believe that if more European nations (like Norway which greeted Ambassador Wharton warmly) accept a Negro diplomat as *persona grata*, more African nations will do so. But until then and until American Negroes approach "The Promised Land" of first-class citizenship, African nations cannot fairly be criticized if they resist appointments which seem to indicate that they are second-class nations.

On a different level, President Kennedy confronts another dilemma, namely, the competence of the white ambassadors to African nations. Only a very few of them have had previous experience in Africa. But it has been common practice for many years to assign a career diplomat to a European post, to a Latin American post, to an Asian post, to the State Department. The Negro Foreign Service Officer mentioned above had not had experience in Hungary or in Pakistan when he was posted to those countries, but he fulfilled his missions admirably there as he had done in Liberia, Paris and at the State Department.

Kennedy has had to appoint more new ambassadors than any President of the United States. I believe that this large number plus the traditional appointments of some "Ugly Americans" may have resulted in the choice of a few ambassadors who have neither the competence nor the good will to promote the best interests of the United States and of the people of the African nations. Once again, however, it is too soon to judge fairly.

¹⁰ Department of State, *News Letter*, September, 1961, p. 42.

The United States and the Colonial Powers

A second major question is this: Has United States sympathy for African nationalism alienated the former colonial powers? In general, no. Britain's voluntary policy of "creative abdication" needed little prodding from the United States in the granting of independence to the Sudan in 1956, to Ghana in 1957, and in preparations for independence for most of the other British African colonies. American pressure had little if anything to do with the French *loi cadre* (framework law) of June 23, 1956, which conceded autonomy to the French overseas territories or with the implementation of this law in April, 1957. John Foster Dulles, on November 18, 1958, did not therefore alienate Britain or France when he stated: "The United States supports political independence for all peoples who desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities. We have encouraged and we rejoice at the current evolution."¹¹

Joseph Satterthwaite, who in 1958 became the first official to hold the position of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, hedged a bit when he declared on May 1, 1959:

We support African political aspirations where they are moderate, nonviolent, and constructive and take into account their obligations to and interdependence with the world community. We also support the principle of continued African ties with Western Europe. We see no reason why there should be a conflict between the two concepts.¹²

Events soon proved this policy statement unrealistic both with respect to nonviolence and continued ties with Western Europe. Guinea's separation of her ties with France already gave some evidence of the latter point and chaos in the former Belgian Congo gave evidence of unrealism with respect to both these premises before the end of the Eisenhower administration.

The ineptitude of the Eisenhower policy in Guinea which almost equalled that of France won temporarily at least the favor

of France and the other colonial powers. When Guinea, alone of the former French overseas territories, voted for independence in the referendum of September 28, 1958, France withdrew its personnel and technicians as fast as possible; cut financial aid estimated at about \$17 million a year; ceased to buy Guinea's bananas at subsidized prices; removed or destroyed government records and maps, and even medicines in hospitals.

For several months France, and at her insistence, her colonial allies and the United States refused to recognize the government of Sékou Touré.¹³ The belated appointment of Dr. John Morrow, a Negro Professor of French, as Ambassador to Guinea, and the red-carpet treatment given to Sékou Touré on his visit to the United States in 1959 partly mollified him and the leaders of other African nations that frequently revealed sympathy for Soviet policies.

Prior to the Angola open revolt of March, 1961, the chaos in the former Belgian Congo revealed the greatest animosity perhaps against the United States. Until the publication of a volume of *Foreign Relations*, most historians will be reluctant to state what United States policies were. A few personal observations are offered as indications of French and Belgian criticism and not as evidence of either United States policies or of their effect on these two and perhaps other colonial allies.

High-ranking French officials in West Africa told me during the summer of 1953 that the United States was supporting African nationalism so that, when the European powers were forced out, American business interests would acquire larger stakes. A survey during the summer of 1960 of the Parisian press from *Le Figaro* to *L'Humanité* and of the Brussels press from *La Libre Belgique* to *Le Drapeau Rouge* revealed recurrent attacks on the United States. The government papers differed little from the liberal and Communist papers until an American firm, the Congo International Management Corporation, was discredited as an alleged instrument of the State Department. The Communist papers continued even after that to hammer at American "economic imperial-

¹¹ *State Department Bulletin*, December 8, 1958, p. 897.

¹² *Ibid.*, May 25, 1959, p. 749.

¹³ Thomas Hodgkin and Ruth Schachter, "French-speaking west Africa in transition," *International Conciliation* (May, 1960), p. 423.

ism" in the Congo. By that time the intrusion of Russia and the Belgian support of the richest province, Katanga, so compounded the Congo crisis that the effect of United States policies there on our Nato allies who were or are colonial powers almost defies definite conclusions.

One aspect of criticism of the United States by the Parisian and Brussels press during the summer of 1960 revealed a bitter racism. Some Right-wing papers expressed their outrage that Lumumba had slept in the same bed in the President's Guest House in Washington that had given repose to President de Gaulle and other European heads of state or of government. When Lumumba visited Howard University, some of these papers referred to it as "*une université noire*" on the periphery of the city. In fact, Howard has a considerable number of non-Negroes on its faculty and the second largest percentage of foreign students of any institution of higher learning in the United States; instead of being on the periphery of the city, it is about ten minutes by automobile from the White House.

French and Belgian newspapers had previously criticized American policies, but rarely had they based such vitriolic attacks upon alleged American support of an African nationalist movement. On the other hand, some French papers attributed Belgium's premature grant of independence primarily to the existence of the French Republic of Congo whose capital, Brazzaville, is a short distance across the Congo River from Leopoldville.

Independence in French Congo hastened independence in Belgian Congo; violence in Belgian Congo triggered open large-scale revolt in the neighboring Portuguese "overseas province" of Angola. United States policy toward this revolt evoked the most acidulous criticism by Portugal, more virulent probably than that by any other colonial power which faced the almost inevitable necessity of granting self-government or independence in Africa.

Portugal and Angola

Prior to the revolt in Angola of March, 1961, cumulative evidence confirmed reports of widespread forced labor, poverty, 98 per cent illiteracy, and an oppressive regime which followed closely Prime Minister Salazar's dictatorship in Portugal.¹⁴ The United States (and the U.S.S.R.) supported a draft resolution in the Security Council co-sponsored by Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic requesting the appointment of an investigatory subcommittee.

After this draft resolution failed of adoption, the United States supported a similar resolution in the General Assembly, April 20, 1961, where it obtained an overwhelming vote of 73 to 2 (Spain and South Africa). Brazil and the United Kingdom, two of Portugal's staunchest allies, were among the 9 abstainers; Portugal absented itself during the debate. Before the Subcommittee (Bolivia, Dahomey, Finland, Malaya and Sudan) had a chance to do more than organize itself, circumstantial reports of fighting on a more extensive and brutal scale led the African and Asian nations to call for another session of the Security Council.¹⁵

A wave of angry denunciation not only in the new African states, but also in some of Portugal's Nato Allies, especially England and the United States, led Salazar to announce his intention to introduce reforms leading toward self-government, in a press interview, published May 31. The Security Council, however, adopted a resolution on June 9, "deeply deploring the large-scale killings and the severely repressive measures in Angola."¹⁶ The Council was "convinced that the continuation of the situation in Angola . . . is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security." It therefore called upon the Portuguese authorities "to desist forthwith from repressive measures and further to extend every facility to the Sub-Committee to enable it to perform its task expeditiously." The Council adopted this resolution by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (France and the United Kingdom).¹⁷

Charles W. Yost, Deputy United States Representative in the Security Council, ex-

¹⁴ The publication of James Duffy's *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959) gave respectability to what had previously been termed "irresponsible charges."

¹⁵ "Issues before the sixteenth general assembly," *International Conciliation* (September, 1961), pp. 56-58.

¹⁶ For the text, see *Current History*, October, 1961, p. 238.

¹⁷ *State Department Bulletin*, July 10, 1961, p. 89.

plaining why the United States would vote for the resolution, tried to soothe Salazar's feelings and to strengthen his announced intention of accelerating progress toward self-government. Mr. Yost said that the United States government viewed Salazar's statement "as an encouraging development" and hoped that

concrete steps will be taken by the Portuguese Government in the immediate future. We believe Portugal should be given a certain time to announce and carry out concrete reforms in the direction which Premier Salazar has forecast. . . . We hope that at least in those areas not disrupted by violence political, economic and social reforms will be announced without delay.¹⁸

Yost's soothing words did not console Salazar. On June 30, 1961, he accused the United States of siding with Russia over Angola for political purposes. Consequently, the United States was pursuing a policy that was irreconcilable with the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty. Application of the principle of self-determination to the Portuguese overseas territories would result in independence but the new nations would be so weak economically that they would be annexed by neighboring countries. "It can be stated that Portugal cannot be considered less worthy or capable than any other country in the exercise of sovereignty," declared Salazar. Another news report on the same day stated that "African rebels and Portuguese troops are turning a great swath of Northern Angola into a desolate battlefield on which the future of Portugal's West African colony is being fought."¹⁹

Other reports, some of them from Protestant and Catholic missionaries, narrated tales of shocking brutality on both sides and of native losses in killed and wounded which greatly exceeded those of the Portuguese. Circumstantial accounts of minor uprisings led to Portuguese fears that Mozambique would follow in the wake of Angola; a French African diplomat in the United States referred to Portuguese Guinea as La Guinée dite Portugaise." In the former

Belgian Congo Holden Roberto was awaiting continued deterioration in Angola so that he could lead an army of native refugees from Angola and of Congolese to overthrow the oldest European colonial empire in Africa.

Perhaps the death of Salazar will enable Portugal to adopt a policy which will give effect to his statement published on May 31. For the reforms that his Overseas Minister Adriano Moreira announced on August 28 "suggested to most observers that the reforms were alleviative in nature and represented no basic change in Portuguese colonial policy."²⁰ A new regime in Portugal might understand that it is becoming increasingly difficult for the United States to support Western-oriented dictatorships, especially if they are too decrepit materially to strengthen the Nato posture and to maintain white supremacy in Africa. Neither the bid for African votes in the United Nations nor for Negro votes in Harlem, Chicago, Philadelphia and Detroit aligns the United States against Portugal. But Portugal's decadence and the American conscience do.

The United States and Bizerte

African nations generally applauded the vote of the United States in favor of the Security Council's resolution on June 9 against Portugal. But they generally condemned the action of the United States on the Assembly's resolutions with respect to the armed clash at Bizerte and Eric Louw's speech of October 11. On August 25 the General Assembly by a vote of 66 to 0, with 30 abstentions including the United States, called upon France to negotiate with Tunisia on French withdrawal from the naval base at Bizerte. Delegates from some of the new French African nations, however, expressed to me greater indignation against France and de Gaulle than they did against the United States. With the exception of Ivory Coast and Niger which, like France, were absent, all the members of the Brazzaville Bloc plus Cameroun and Togo voted for the resolution. Congo (Leopoldville), Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan and the United Arab Republic also voted with the majority, as did the Soviet bloc. Members of Nato divided: Denmark, Norway, Turkey and Iceland

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

¹⁹ *Washington Star*, June 30, 1961, p. C-7.

²⁰ *Africa Report*, October, 1961, p. 11.

voted for the resolution while the others, except France which boycotted the session, joined the United States in abstaining.²¹

Adlai Stevenson explained the abstention on the grounds of friendship with Tunisia, the Nato alliance with France, and fear that adoption of the resolution would retard bilateral negotiations between France and Tunisia.²² The adoption of the resolution did not prevent these bilateral negotiations.

Two other reasons probably explain the difference between the United States votes of June 9 and of August 26. France's military posture is greater than that of Portugal's, and France has granted independence to all of its African overseas and trust territories which desired it. Portugal seems determined to hold on to its African "overseas provinces" as long as it can.

The United States and South Africa

Eric Louw, Foreign Minister of the Republic of South Africa, provoked on October 11, the first vote of censure in the General Assembly. He spoke in defense of his government's white-supremacy policies and said that South Africa's disfranchised and segregated "Bantu" enjoy better living conditions than do the peoples of the independent Black African states. African delegates promptly attacked Louw's speech as "insulting" and "racist." A Liberian motion of censure, expressing the Assembly's disapproval of the speech as "offensive, fictitious and erroneous" was speedily passed by a vote of 67 to 1 (South Africa). Twenty-nine countries, including the United States, Britain and France, either abstained or refused to participate in the censure vote. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson later declared in a press interview that "while we reject the views of the Foreign Minister of South Africa on the subject of apartheid, and have so stated many times, we rightly support his right—and the right of every speaker before the General Assembly—to state his views."

I agree with this defense of freedom of speech, a defense strongly supported by editorials in the *Washington Post* and the

Washington Star on October 13, but I wonder whether United States exports of uranium from the Republic of South Africa prevented Stevenson from making this statement condemning apartheid during the debate on the motion to censure the Union.

If African nations make a formal attempt to expel South Africa from the United Nations, the United States will probably have to vote for or against the motion. The Kennedy administration would thus be confronted with the most decisive issue involving Black Africa versus Nato and the Republic.

Pan-Africanism has made little progress since my article in the October, 1961, issue of *Current History*. But Portugal's continued obstinacy, France's temporary stubbornness and South Africa's rationalized stubbornness are creating an African bloc in the United Nations which may help to overcome some obstacles toward Black African unity within the continent.

Kennedy and the Volta River Project

This ominous confrontation has made more difficult a Kennedy decision with respect to American aid for the construction of the Volta River Project in Ghana. A clause in the current foreign aid bill seemed to mean that the United States would withhold aid from countries which did not share our views on major world problems. Since President Kwame Nkrumah seemed to be veering more and more to the Left with his visits to Moscow and Peking after the Belgrade Conference,²³ apparently well founded reports stated that Kennedy was reviewing American aid to Ghana. The President's reply to a question at his news conference on October 11 hardly clarified his policy. "Our view of the world crisis," he said, "is that countries are entitled to national sovereignty and independence, and that is all we ever suggested. That is the purpose of our aid, to make it more possible."

This excerpt—the rest of his answer became more and more fuzzy—varies somewhat from that which he made to the American Society of African Culture in June, 1959. "*The people of Africa*," he then declared, "*are more interested in development than they are in doctrine. They*

²¹ *The New York Times*, August 26, 1961, pp. 1, 3.

²² *Loc. cit.*

²³ For a perceptive analysis, see "The Meaning of Belgrade," by Walter Z. Laqueur and Alfred Sherman, in *Africa Report*, October, 1961, pp. 7, 12.

(Continued on p. 48)

"For a decade the United States has practiced a form of coexistence. Its day-to-day policies toward the Mainland nowhere anticipated the destruction of the Peking government. It accepted the existence of two Chinas because its interests would demand nothing less and its power would permit nothing more."

China: Unanswered Challenge

By NORMAN A. GRAEBNER

Professor of History, University of Illinois

EDMUND BURKE once observed that the art of statesmanship is to grant graciously what ultimately cannot be denied. This is a simple admonition, having the defense of logic and common sense. Yet the eternal problem of adjusting to realities in world politics that cannot or will not be changed creates the most pervading and troublesome of all challenges to the wisdom and intelligence of diplomats and nations alike. Emotional attachments and traditional commitments often tempt the wisest of statesmen to cling to objectives that far transcend the power and interests of their countries. When outmoded ambitions abroad attain the status of powerful political symbols, the determined rejection of unwelcome, if inescapable, elements in international life must result in either extreme embarrassment or barren conflict.

For the administration of John F. Kennedy no external challenge has raised this question more disturbingly than the issue of United States-Chinese relations. Throughout the past decade the spokesmen for Nationalist China in American life have

demanding no less than the establishment of a government on the China mainland that would again accept the goodwill and paternalism of the United States and open again that nation's doors to American missionaries, students and businessmen. This magnificent purpose they would achieve through the simple device of Chiang Kai-shek's return to power over all China. Supported by such apparently reasonable goals, the Nationalist China bloc has insisted that the question of United States involvement in the Chinese civil war is hardly a subject for legitimate national debate.

Unfortunately those who have had the power to hold the nation to its diplomatic preferences for Chiang have not had the power to build a national policy. Indeed, their ambition has had no relationship to the means at their disposal. The Republic of China remains isolated on Taiwan, a government in exile. The Peking regime has not collapsed. Instead it has unleashed within China a new energy and discipline that has rapidly carried that country to a dominant position in Asian affairs. Mao Tse-tung and his Communist associates, moreover, have capitalized on American intransigence to turn the United States into a scapegoat for the internal problems of the Peking government—population expansion, famine, commune and industrial failure. Hating America has been the essential ploy in the Communist drive to solidify its control over a vastly diversified population.

What is more, American leadership has been no more successful in building a viable defense structure to contain mainland China

Norman A. Graebner, chairman of the history department at Illinois, is a contributing editor of *Current History*. Early in 1958, Mr. Graebner delivered the Commonwealth Fund Lectures in London on the subject, "The Revolution in American Politics, 1837-1877." He is the author of *Empire on the Pacific* and *The New Isolationism*, and is also a contributor to many scholarly journals.

than it has been in destroying the Peking regime. Seato is so divided diplomatically and ineffectual militarily that it has been paralyzed in every crisis since its creation. Washington officials have never explained to either the Asian or the American people whether the American alliance system of East and Southeast Asia is designed to stabilize the *status quo* or to eliminate the Peking regime. If the official objective of the United States in the Far East is to underwrite a policy of coexistence with mainland China, then the words uttered in behalf of Chiang Kai-shek for the past decade are completely devoid of meaning. If it is the serious intention of this nation to return Chiang to the mainland, then that purpose defies the will of the nation's allies. To them the alliance system has never been more than defensive in nature.

The Immediate Issues

Two immediate issues—that of the offshore islands and that of Chinese representation in the United Nations—threaten Chiang Kai-shek's moral and political stature before the world and thus create special problems for a committed Washington. Strategically, there is little or no connection between the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu and Chiang's stronghold of Formosa. But the Kuomintang is a government in exile. Without hope of a return to the mainland, Chiang readily admits, his regime would disintegrate. The offshore islands are symbols of his return. By identifying the issue of his future with the defense of Quemoy and Matsu, Chiang forced the Eisenhower administration to commit the United States to their defense. At the same time Chiang has assured Washington that his troops alone can defend the islands from assault. "The Chinese Communists," he declared in an interview published in *Look*, June 6, 1961, "cannot launch any direct attack against the Seventh Fleet. Quemoy and Matsu, the front line of defense in the Taiwan Strait, are a shield for the Seventh Fleet."

Similarly Chiang understands that the admission of a Peking delegation to the United Nations as the legitimate spokesman for China would destroy his prestige in the Far East and endanger his entire regime.

It is not strange that the leaders of Nationalist China have pursued every argument, including the promise of an eventual return to the mainland, to sustain the position of their government as one of the Big Five in the world organization. "You in the West must give credence to our intelligence," Chiang repeated recently in *Life* magazine. "Take heed of what we say. We will not mislead you."

For a decade American officials have taken special pride in the successful barring of Red China from the United Nations. Recognition, they have argued, would not only undermine the Nationalist regime but also destroy the confidence of Southeast Asia in this nation's treaty commitments and endanger the effectiveness of the United Nations itself. Red Chinese admission, the State Department has warned, "would amount to a confession of failure on the part of the United Nations and would greatly reduce the prospects for future successful action by the United Nations against aggression." To sustain their past majorities, United States officials have stressed the outlaw and non-representative character of the Peking regime.

Critics of American behavior among neutral and allied leaders, on the other hand, have argued that Red China's diplomatic isolation is responsible for much of Asia's international tension. China, under the direct scrutiny and discipline of the world organization, they believe, might well become more reasonable. U. N. membership entails responsibilities and duties as well as rights and privileges. Both Trygve Lie and his successor as United Nations Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, insisted that Red Chinese involvement would strengthen the organization. Indeed, so overwhelming has been world sentiment in favor of the inclusion of mainland China in the United Nations that many have declared such action necessary to sustain the prestige of the world body. Actually it seems clear that the seating of a Peking delegation in the United Nations would neither benefit greatly nor destroy the organization. The problem of China far transcends any conceivable decisions within the U. N. just as does every other question of power politics. The elements of Chinese power and purpose will, in the

long run, determine that nation's role in world affairs.

The worldwide conviction grows that the perennial American display of deep antagonism toward Peking has more a domestic than an international intent and comprises, therefore, no meaningful response to the Chinese challenge. This has reduced the support of the United States position in the General Assembly. In 1959, the United States prevented a full debate on the question of Chinese representation with a vote of 44 to 29, with 9 abstentions. In 1960, only 42 members supported this nation whereas 34 opposed it and 22 abstained. Nationalist China's waning strength was indicated further by the loss of its seat in the Economic and Social Council which, under an unwritten rule, had always been reserved for the Republic of China as a member of the Big Five. So obvious was the growing opposition to the American position of uncompromising inflexibility that by 1961 few believed that this position would be able to carry another session of the Central Assembly.

Adrift amid Conflicting Pressures

To sustain an unyielding allegiance to the Kuomintang amid worldwide pressures in behalf of Peking the Kennedy administration was forced to assume a particularly obstinate burden. Still it sought no escape. In his first State of the Union message of January 12, 1961, President Kennedy assured Chiang Kai-shek and his American supporters that there would be no change in American policy. "This country," he said, "has continued to withhold recognition of Communist China and to oppose vigorously the admission of this belligerent and unrepentant nation into the U.N." Shortly thereafter the new Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, informed newsmen that the United States did not contemplate the establishment of normal diplomatic relations with the Red Chinese regime. But he added dryly: "The presence in mainland China of a large and powerful force is one of the facts . . . we cannot ignore."

Meanwhile British officials reminded the Kennedy administration that they no longer would support the United States in its behavior toward China. In December, 1960,

Joseph B. Godber, Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, assured the House of Commons that the British government believed that Red China should be in the United Nations. The debate on a resolution censuring the British government for its past support of the United States position demonstrated the strength of the support in both British parties for a new U. N. stand. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, visiting Washington in March, 1961, informed the President that the Western bloc could no longer keep the Chinese question off the U.N. agenda. Any effort to prevent it in 1961, he warned, would result in a humiliating defeat.

Returning to London, Macmillan announced that the Kennedy administration would not sustain the moratorium by opposing debate on the matter of Chinese representation. Instead it would attempt to develop a strategy to keep Peking out of the world organization at least until 1962 so that it could prepare the American people to accept the idea of mainland China's entry into the United Nations.

Macmillan's announcement, designed to reassure the English people that this nation's long-standing policy toward China had been reversed, produced a vehement reaction within the United States. The President, assuring the Republic of China that policy had not changed, termed the London report "not accurate." He made it clear that the United States intended to honor its commitments on recognition and defense to the Chinese Nationalists. Republican leaders in Congress, accepting the President's assurances, suggested new anti-Red Chinese resolutions "to uphold the hand of the President in his stated opposition" to a change of policy. Republican Senator Everett M. Dirksen of Illinois, in a televised news conference, lauded Kennedy for his firmness. Reporters asked Dirksen and Representative Charles A. Halleck of Indiana, House Republican leader who appeared with him, what purpose a congressional resolution would serve if the United States could not control the vote in the General Assembly. Dirksen replied that it would strengthen the opposition of the American people; Halleck added that a strong stand taken by the United States gov-

ernment tended "to enlist support for our position among other governments."

Whatever its public and private assurances to the Nationalist China bloc, the Administration could no longer regard the ten-year record of inflexible opposition to Peking a promising guide for future action. Late in June, therefore, the State Department announced that it was considering a number of alternatives to resolve the dilemma posed by Taipei's declining support in the United Nations. In conversations with Zentaro Kosaka, Japan's foreign minister, Secretary Rusk unveiled a two-China proposal which would offer Communist China and Nationalist China equal representation in the United Nations General Assembly. Peking, having declared repeatedly that it would not share representation with the Nationalists, would, under the new American plan, refuse to accept its seat and thereafter bear sole responsibility for its continued diplomatic isolation. Rusk at the same time assured the China bloc that the United States was not planning the entry of Red China into the U.N., but rather was attempting to prevent Nationalist China from losing its seat.

For the Kuomintang the new strategy was totally unacceptable; its reaction was uncompromising. Said one official: "We are opposed . . . to any arrangement which would lead to the implication of a 'two China' situation in the United Nations." Dirksen announced late in June that congressional Republicans were contemplating the attaching of an anti-Red Chinese resolution to the President's foreign aid bill, especially since the State Department was opposing the passage of such a resolution by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On July 1, the American Legion, in national convention, demanded that President Kennedy oppose "with all his might" the admission of Red China to the United Nations even if it necessitated the replacement of Adlai Stevenson, the country's chief U. N. delegate.

What aggravated the pressures on the Administration during July was the State Department's announced plan to extend diplomatic recognition to Outer Mongolia. Dirksen and Halleck brought a prepared statement on Outer Mongolia to their news

conference of July 13. Said Halleck: "The continued display of interest by some high officials in the admission of Red China to the United Nations is bad enough, but the sudden emergence of a proposal to recognize Outer Mongolia is simply incredible." It was no wonder, he added, that the nation's friends in Asia questioned the sincerity of American policy.

To Marvin Liebman, secretary of the Committee of One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations, writing to *The New York Times*, the vast majority of Congress and the American people opposed the recognition of this "part and parcel of the Communist empire." The Administration's rationale that the acceptance of Outer Mongolia's admission to the U.N. was essential to achieve Soviet approval of Mauretania's appeared to Chiang's supporters as an opening wedge for Peking's entry. Senator Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire, informed the Senate that recognition of Outer Mongolia "would merely be a side-door device to make the recognition of Red China a bit easier to put over at an early date."

Again Administration spokesmen assured both Chiang and the American people that its purpose for China had not changed. What had changed were the means to be employed against the onrush of world opinion favorable to Peking's entry into the U.N. After a White House conference late in July, American Ambassador to Nationalist China Everett F. Drumright admitted to newsmen that the President was still debating alternate courses of action, but concluded: "You may be sure that he will try to come up with a solution that will keep our ally, the Government of the Republic of China, in and the Reds out." The Senate on July 28 passed a strong resolution in opposition to the seating of a Communist Chinese delegation in the U.N., declaring that Peking had "imposed on the Chinese people one of the most brutal regimes known to history, and is without authority to speak for the Chinese people other than the authority that derives from usurpation and tyranny." Such leading Democrats as J. William Fulbright defended their votes for the resolution by declaring that it represented the Administration's view of the issue.

To reassure Nationalist China that this nation's support for seating Outer Mongolia in the U.N. was designed only to sustain whatever support Taipei still enjoyed among the African nations, President Kennedy invited Chen Cheng, Vice President and Premier of Nationalist China, to visit him in Washington during the first days of August. During his conferences with Chen, who was accompanied by Shen Chang-huan, foreign minister of the Republic of China, the President reaffirmed this nation's support for the Nationalist cause. The President's guest list at dinner, which included some of the leading spokesmen for Nationalist China in the United States, was further evidence that the Administration had no intention of modifying its Far Eastern policies as they affected China. Much to the dismay of American leaders, Chen announced before the National Press Club that if every other means failed Nationalist China would veto the admission of Outer Mongolia to the U.N.

In their joint communiqué which terminated their meetings the President and the Vice President noted the reports of apathy, discontent, and disillusionment on the mainland of China. They agreed that the Communist regime could not meet the genuine needs and desires of the Chinese people for economic and social progress as they had been met on Formosa with substantial American assistance. The thorny issue of Outer Mongolia the two National spokesmen left unresolved.

The China Issue in the U.N.

Hard on the heels of its public assurances to Chiang Kai-shek the Administration during August announced that it would desert the ten-year tradition of leading the opposition to any formal debate in the General Assembly on the question of Chinese representation. The new strategy encompassed a graceful concession on the simple matter of discussion but it included a delaying action as well. By having the General Assembly vote to establish a committee or panel to spend the next year in studying the China question, the United States would gain at least an additional year before it had to face the burgeoning reality of Red Chinese admission.

When the sixteenth General Assembly con-

vened in September, New Zealand, with United States approval, proposed that "representation of China" be included on the 1961 agenda. During the brief flurry over the new agenda, Valerian A. Zorin, the Soviet Union's chief delegate, attacked the Republic of China as a "bankrupt Clique" and a "rotten regime." As the Soviet bloc delegates stomped from the hall, T. F. Tsiang, Nationalist China's delegate, repeated the perennial defense of Chiang's government as the only legitimate representative of China's nearly 700 million people. With a minimum of delay, the Assembly, on September 25, adopted the agenda proposed by the steering committee, which included the question of Communist China's admission. The unprecedented American silence during the brief debate over the agenda represented a minor revolution in United States policy.

Clearly Nationalist China's position in the United Nations had long been dependent upon the support of the United States. "If only the United States will stand absolutely solid," one Taipei official declared as late as May, 1961, "we shan't worry too much about the result in the United Nations." But by September it seemed apparent that this nation could protect Chiang's claims only temporarily and through political maneuvering. The Republic of China, during the opening weeks of the session, faced bitter opposition from all sides.

Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China stated the issue in Communist bloc terms when he declared on September 22 that the forthcoming debate on Peking's admission would reveal "which countries stand on the side of justice and are friendly to China and which countries stand on the side of injustice and follow the United States in being hostile to China." Visiting President Ibrahim Abboud of Sudan, representing a typical African-neutralist conviction, declared before the General Assembly on October 13 that admission of Peking would recognize the legitimate rights of the Chinese people and their government, enhance the effectiveness of the U.N., and aid in the solution of such world problems as disarmament. "If this organization," he said, "is to be a true community of nations, it cannot close its doors to a quarter of the inhabitants of the globe."

Nationalist Chinese spokesmen in the United Nations were reduced to the necessity of carrying their own defense. On October 4, Foreign Minister Shen Chang-huan warned the General Assembly that the United Nations would be destroyed if it admitted to its membership "international bullies" disqualified by the spirit and letter of its Charter. There was, he said, too much appeasement in the air. Nationalist China, he promised, would liberate the mainland "if the opportunity presents itself." The very existence of the Republic of China, ran his conclusion, "implies the eventual restoration of freedom to the six hundred million Chinese people now under the domination of the Communist regime."

Following a hurried conference in Taipei on October 14 with George Yeh, Nationalist Ambassador to Washington, Chiang retreated from his adamant opposition to U.N. membership for Outer Mongolia. In persuading the Generalissimo finally that his country should not resort to the veto, United States officials promised: (1) not to recognize Outer Mongolia as they had originally intended; (2) to abstain rather than vote affirmatively in the Security Council on seating the Mongol republic; and (3) to cancel a decision to readmit to this country Dr. Thomas W. I. Liao, the noted Taiwanese leader residing in Tokyo, who is renowned for his bitter opposition to Nationalist China and Communist China alike. It appeared strange that Washington would have made such extensive concessions to Chiang, especially since it asked of him only what was in his own best interests. Permitting Dr. Liao to tour the United States would give the American people an important opportunity to learn more about the sentiments of the Taiwanese and their hopes for the future.

Finally, on October 25, the Security Council, by a vote of 9 to 0, with the United States and Nationalist China abstaining, approved membership for Outer Mongolia. To make it clear again that this negative acceptance of the Asian republic signified no softening of this nation's opposition to the admission of Red China, President Kennedy announced as late as October 19 that the United States "firmly opposes the entry of the Chinese Communists into the United Nations" or any of its agencies.

Meanwhile continued reverses in the U.N. rendered the Kennedy administration's repeated assurances to Chiang almost meaningless. The move whereby the Western powers would ask the Assembly to establish a committee to study Chinese representation was championed originally by Britain and Sweden. By mid-October both nations informed Washington that they would not introduce the proposal. A frantic survey of the U.N. membership revealed that not one nation, whether it had recognized the Peking regime or not, cared any longer to lead a fight to bar Communist China from the organization. New Zealand, Australia, and the Philippines, all members of Seato, expressed no interest in the American strategy whatever. Early in November, American spokesmen in the U.N. had not despaired of finding a delegation that would support the delaying tactic. It seemed increasingly clear, however, that the United States would be forced to assume the responsibility itself.

There was something tragic in the Kennedy response to the inescapable challenge posed by Communist China. Washington officials, conscious of the dilemma which they faced, attempted through a shifting U.N. strategy to adjust this nation's purpose for China to its deepening isolation from world sentiment. Yet the continued verbal identification of American will with the ambitions of Chiang Kai-shek could only subject the nation to unprecedented, if unnecessary, humiliation should the U.N. extend recognition to the Peking regime. The insistence that policy had not changed contributed nothing to the necessary education of the American people; it left the great mass of the nation's citizens almost totally uninformed of the facts in the Asian situation.

Need for a Policy

Nowhere in official statements was there any definition of a realistic policy or the extent to which such a policy might endanger or not endanger the fundamental interests of the United States. Indeed, the wide range of issues presented by an energetic and ambitious China remained buried away in the question of representation. Nor did another year of grace promise any effort on the part of the government to fulfill its obligation to educate the public.

Throughout 1961 there was only one apparent escape for the nation from the trap created by its past commitments to the Kuomintang. What was required above all was the determination of American officials to establish sufficient balance between ends and means in their design for China that the result could be termed a policy. Such a program could hardly offer Peking less than co-existence through the serious acceptance of the notion of two Chinas. On the other hand, it required the establishment of a body of clearly-defined and militarily-feasible interests which might be supported by a strong and integrated coalition that agreed on both purpose and method. For a decade the United States has practiced a form of co-existence. Its day-to-day policies toward the mainland nowhere anticipated the destruction of the Peking government. It accepted the existence of two Chinas because its interests would demand nothing less and its power would permit nothing more.

Unfortunately Washington officials, to protect the Republic of China from disintegration, were forced to deny the viability and even the morality of a two-China solution. This suggests that any purposeful effort at coexistence must commence with the troublesome admission that the destiny of China rests within the power structure of China itself. If the United States can no longer control the course of events in the U.N., it can, without extending its Far Eastern military commitment, adopt a positive, if limited, policy designed to preserve Taiwan's future as an independent nation. This proposal would force the Chinese Reds to pay some price for admission to the U.N. Any past American commitments in the Far East that transcended the *status quo* in the Formosa

Straits have been meaningless or dangerous.

Again to perpetuate the existence of the Kuomintang the Kennedy administration made no apparent effort to establish a policy for the offshore islands which might in the long run preserve separate U.N. membership for Taiwan or any other *quid pro quo*. In July, 1960, Tengku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya and one of Southeast Asia's most determined anti-Communist leaders, called for not only the immediate acceptance of both Communist China and Nationalist China by the U.N. but also a settlement of the conflict over the offshore islands. An all-out assault on Quemoy, he predicted, would force the United States either to employ its nuclear weapons or to stand by while Chiang lost the best portion of his army. The first alternative would create a feeling of such revulsion that all pro-American governments in Asia would be in danger of toppling; the second would raise doubts among the free nations of Asia as to the seriousness of the American commitment to their defense. Either consequence would be disastrous.

At this period of crisis in American-Chinese relations the words of Washington's Farewell Address have special meaning: "The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and interest." What continues to dismay many students of American foreign relations is the fact that for a decade the nation has defied Washington's admonition so thoroughly that it has permitted control of an important segment of its external policies to be transferred from Washington to Taipei.

"... Recently internal warfare has gained a new prominence in Soviet dogma. What Khrushchev calls 'wars of liberation' or 'just wars' are now considered the most promising paths to further expansion. The theory enables Moscow and Peiping to manipulate for their own purposes the political, economic and social revolutionary fervor which is now sweeping much of the underdeveloped world. Since many governments are weak . . . ; and since the Communist conspirators are well trained and supplied, it is usually fairly easy to start or take advantage of an internal war and to claim that years of blood and terror are in the people's interest. . . ."—Roger Hilsman, *Director of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State, August 10, 1961.*

After the Cuban fiasco, "the unique advantage enjoyed by the New Frontier in the United Nations had suddenly disappeared, and before three months had passed, the charismatic attraction of its chief delegate as well. Stevenson remained, but he had begun to look like Lodge."

The New Frontier in the United Nations

By ROSS N. BERKES

*Director of the School of International Relations,
University of Southern California*

WE MUST neither say too much nor judge too quickly. For in the imagery of C. L. Sulzberger's despairing editorial after the death of Dag Hammarskjöld, borrowing from Emerson, "Things are in the saddle and ride mankind." The new Administration's first year in the United Nations was not auspicious. One would be hard pressed to say it was even successful. This is awkward, for the Kennedy administration was tooled from the outset to be not merely successful, but auspiciously so, and not least of all in the realm of United Nations affairs. Not that the young and new President ever revealed much of an interest in Wilsonian precepts, but it was a time for new leadership, and the United Nations was the place for Adlai Stevenson.

The beginning, at least, was auspicious, launched as it was on January 27, 1961,

by Stevenson's first press conference as the new Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. In Alistair Cooke's account of this colorful affair, Stevenson was warmly received by a record turn-out and "blushingly acknowledged the emotional assertion of a Thai correspondent that 'some of us are still all the way with Adlai.'" As if to cut clearly from the past and from the cold warrior image of his predecessor, Senator Lodge, Stevenson commented on the dangers of "rhetorical violence," and of the impropriety of using the United Nations "for narrow propaganda purposes." Supporting the President's declared wish "to return to dignified diplomatic usage," Stevenson concluded with the memorable remark that the United Nations should "not be an arena in which to fight the cold war, but rather an instrument to settle it."

This was indeed, and in more ways than one, a "memorable remark." Three days later, in a shade less flowing rhetoric, President Kennedy repeated the homily in his message to Congress. And on the very next day the concept was again invoked as Stevenson in his Security Council debut graciously recalled to his listeners "the President's view of the United Nations 'as an instrument to end the cold war instead of an arena to fight it.'" The point was made, the language chosen, the authorship preempted or ascribed; the tone of the new order had been set.

There was, after all, just so much to Senator Lodge, and borrowing from his own

Ross N. Berkes, a contributing editor of CURRENT HISTORY, has had wide experience in international affairs. He spent the fall of 1958 in Washington on a special assignment for the United States Department of State, and has taught at the United States Naval Intelligence School in Washington, D.C. On sabbatical leave, 1955-1956, he studied British foreign policy at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London. In 1945, he served on the staff of the Allied Secretariat, Four Power Control Council on Germany.

Shakespearian quotations, it was "a weary, stale, flat and unprofitable" business, constantly to be compelled to rebut untruths." This he did daily. No doubt the halls still ring with the spitting and hissing of transcendent quarrels as Lodge rose to each Soviet insult, each Russian lie. "Outrageous," "mendacious," "untrue," "truly incendiary," "a long-winded bit of Communist nonsense"—this was the language of Senator Lodge as he responded to Sobolev's vicious attacks on Belgium in the first Security Council debates on the Congo, July 13, 1960; it was the language he had used for seven weary, stale, flat and unprofitable years at the United Nations. Fairly or unfairly, this had symbolized the range of America's vocabulary in the world's greatest forum. It was time for new words, new thoughts and new personalities.

From Lodge to Stevenson represented also a change in political preoccupation. Lodge had filled a domestic need, making the American association with the United Nations palatable to Republicans at home. Perhaps he did not make it palatable, but to his undying credit he did make it tolerable to them, or nearly so. On the other hand, Stevenson was appointed to fill a different kind of need, that of building greater rapport with the non-European world outside the Soviet orbit, of beginning new and hopeful conversations with Africans, Asians and Latin Americans—the people Lodge saw only dimly, from the corner of his eye.

It was to be through Stevenson, the man, that all the little people descending on the United Nations would learn to know and to have confidence in Stevenson, the Permanent American Representative. It was to be Stevenson, the warm and delightful personality, enjoying informal evenings with shoes off—figuratively or literally—in the crowded New York apartments of obscure African delegates to the United Nations. This, too, was a part of the new order. And it was well conceived.

Even the Soviet Union responded. No sooner had President Kennedy indicated that he would continue the ban on Soviet overflights than the Soviet Union replied by releasing the captured American airmen. In the United Nations the Russians graciously

withdrew their formal complaint of aggressive action having to do with the U-2 and other aspects of past American behavior. Stevenson and Gromyko agreed to defer the problem of disarmament, volatile as it always was, to the next General Assembly session, and thus, presumably, to permit the resumed Fifteenth Session to close out in relative peace and quiet. As one observer remarked during this unusual period: even Soviet Ambassador Zorin "thought it best to wear a smile."

A Test of the New Look

The first test of the new look took place in March, 1961, when Liberia, backed by 28 Afro-Asian states, requested a Security Council debate on "The Situation in Angola." It was a considerable victory for the Afro-Asian world to get Angola discussed in the Security Council at all. Five of the 11 members expressed doubt as to the competence of the Security Council in the matter, but not Stevenson, who instead proceeded to deliver a remarkable statement: "We recognize that while Angola and the conditions therein do not today endanger international peace and security, we believe they may, if not alleviated, lead to more disorders with unfortunate and dangerous consequences. . . ." On the basis of this logic, Stevenson took exception to the views of those who doubted the Security Council's competence.

As one reflects upon this historic performance, it may be difficult to resist the conclusion that Stevenson was in effect arguing that whereas the Security Council was not competent to take up the situation in Angola at the time, it might well be later, so why not now since it might have to later. This first sacrifice of the new regime seems to have been made at the altar of irrationality.

The three Afro-Asian powers on the Security Council, Liberia, Ceylon and the United Arab Republic, were defeated on Angola—their draft resolution being unable to muster more than five of the seven votes required. Besides their own, the other two affirmative votes cast on March 15 were those of the Soviet Union and the United States. On the other side—even if only abstaining—were the six votes of Britain, France, China, Turkey, Chile and Ecuador.

The new American position in debates on colonialism signaled by this particular vote in the Security Council on March 15, 1961, led to such a flood of inquiries (and remonstrances?) that an official spokesman for the American delegation was compelled to release a statement two days later conveying direct assurances that "The United States decision to vote for the resolution was made only after thorough consultation between Governor Stevenson and the officers of the Department and after approval by the Secretary of State and the President. . . ."

The same statement offered reassurances that "our allies were informed in advance," but concluded with the advice that, as between ourselves and our allies, "The difficulty and complexity of African questions are, however, such that there are and may continue to be differences in approach on some of them." As if to prove the point, action of the General Assembly a month later on the same issue and a similar resolution succeeded by a vote of 73-2-9; we voted—along with the Soviet bloc and all the Afro-Asian powers—with the 73. Britain, France, Netherlands, *et al.*, ranged with the 9. Angola had become a symbol of the new age of American policy in the United Nations.

The stamp of the new policy was to be seen on the perennial question of Southwest Africa, when the General Assembly in the same month passed by an overwhelming vote (84-0-8) the strongest, most adamant resolution it had ever seriously considered on the issue of South African policy toward and in the territory. To the condemnatory clauses was added the General Assembly's invocation of the Committee on Southwest Africa to visit the territory and to investigate conditions therein, with or without the approval of the government of the Union of South Africa. Just how the Committee was to carry out the task assigned to it by the General Assembly without the approval of South Africa, or what real or fancied expectations it had of securing that approval, seemed of minor or no importance to the 84, and thus, apparently, to us—for we were among the heated, swirling majority that ranged itself against the eight metropolitan and European powers.

As could have been anticipated, and no

doubt was, South Africa refused to admit the Committee to Southwest Africa. Subsequently, on July 9, 1961, the British government refused to allow the Committee even to visit neighboring Bechuanaland, since the Committee would not give assurances that it would not enter Southwest Africa without the South African government's permission. One might ponder this sequence of events, not particularly in terms of Afro-Asian adventuresomeness in maneuvering the General Assembly into impossible boldness, but at least in terms of American endorsement of such behavior. Afro-Asian powers have needed no encouragement toward irresponsible conduct; it was hardly prudent for us to offer encouragement with such competitive abandonment in the General Assembly's handling of Southwest Africa last spring.

One particularly unhappy aspect of Stevenson's cultivation of the new African states during his first period related to his public efforts, begun on March 23, 1961, to stimulate their interest in developing a long-range African aid program that would be administered "by, of and for Africa" through the United Nations. While Stevenson was able to pledge the "wholehearted" support of the United States to such a program—and, later, even "substantial" American aid to African states that had demonstrated their ability to begin intelligent and effective development programs—there was considerable disappointment registered among the attendant African statesmen. Not the least of these was the Nigerian delegate, Jaja Wachuku, whose suspicions of American sincerity were equalled only by the bluntness of his demands for American dollars. Even Stevenson's gentle patience was no match for Wachuku. (But then there really isn't anyone, is there, in the entire annals of United Nations history, that could ever have been a match for Wachuku?)

Breakdown of the U.S. Image

We shall now proceed to one of the "things" that rode Stevenson, if not mankind: the abortive Cuban invasion, as an item for consideration by the General Assembly, April 17-22, 1961. The principles of international behavior to which our

United Nations position in general adhered included, quite prominently, a solemn dedication to the principle of non-intervention in the civil wars of other countries. As a matter of principle, we opposed the use of foreign territory and resources in the promotion of civil strife. However, the higher morality with which we justified our self-limited support for the Cuban invasion was, it appeared, neither negotiable nor even admissible in the United Nations. Indeed, Stevenson's basic position was to reject, as "totally false," all 58 pages of the Cuban delegate's allegation that his country had been invaded by "a mercenary force organized, financed, and armed by the Government of the United States."

To be brief, it was as incredible that this force—mercenary or otherwise—had not been "organized, financed, and armed by the Government of the United States," as it was imprudent for the United States not to have given more effective support to the ill-starred venture. Under the circumstances, Stevenson was his own first casualty, able to parry with the Cuban satyr, Dr. Roa, only by invoking his manifest talents as a nimble debater. One notes here Roa's clever portrayal of Stevenson—the image by respectful references to his books and other writings, only to set up an invidious comparison with Stevenson's present performance, concluding with the now-famous remark: "There must be two Stevensons."

In return, Stevenson became memorable for nailing Dr. Roa with a politically embarrassing but unimpeachable inconsistency in his public views on the Hungarian revolt of 1956. To this smartly executed maneuver, Stevenson added what to him was no doubt irresistible: "For flexibility and agility, I have to concede that even two Stevensons are no match for one Roa."

This was thrust and parry, and the tactics of diversion. It was also a moment of truth, but one which Stevenson was not permitted to face, for we were caught in the ritual of truths the validity of which was conditional. And we were not prepared to argue the conditional nature of the truths to which we so elaborately genuflected in the United Nations. Nor were we willing or ready to disavow them. Stevenson emerged from the Cuban debate not only battle-worn, but

no doubt singed also by the fire of the abortive Mexican draft resolution.

It seems ironic that it fell to Stevenson's lot to protect American interests by having to help defeat a resolution whose purpose was simply to ask all states to ensure that "their territories and resources are not used to promote the civil war in Cuba." The unique advantage enjoyed by the New Frontier in the United Nations had suddenly disappeared, and before three months had passed, the charismatic attraction of its chief delegate, as well. Stevenson remained, but he had begun to look like Lodge.

By the time of the Special Session on Bizerte, late in August, Stevenson had also begun to sound like Lodge. For sheer abuse of machinery, the Bizerte session will rank high and prominently in the annals of the United Nations. It was like something that had been set in motion but with no one still sufficiently interested to inquire why. By the time the session met the only remaining barrier to the ending of the crisis appeared to be the special session itself. In any case, as a first-rate crisis, Bizerte had by then been superseded in time and magnitude by Berlin; a crisis not only not being discussed in the United Nations, but not even on the agenda for the regular Sixteenth Session beginning in September. "Of course," muttered some Englishman (or one supposes it was an Englishman), "Berliners are not brown enough."

The short Bizerte session was an unparalleled opportunity to use the United Nations as a billiard table; to carom smartly off Bizerte in order to hit some other favorite target. Besides being tempting, it was prudent; for even the Afro-Asian powers realized the virtues of treading lightly for the moment on the Franco-Tunisian quarrel. And so Cuba found in Bizerte an appropriate gateway to a tirade on Guantanamo; the Soviet Union—happily if somewhat lonesomely continuing to stir the Bizerte pot—found in it yet another opportunity to launch its verbal assault on the worldwide system of foreign bases. The old times were back again, and the American delegate moved forward to counter-attack:

Before I discuss the matter before us, let me say that perhaps we can ignore the shamelessness of the denunciation of troops on foreign

soils uttered here . . . by the representative of the Soviet Union whose conquering armies are still in Poland, East Germany, Hungary and other countries, sixteen years after the second world war. But, in all fairness, we cannot overlook that France has given independence to territories, including Tunisia itself, as vast as those the Soviet Union has subjugated. . . . The Soviet record of cynical suppression of freedom and of self-determination is in sharp contrast to the self-righteousness of its rhetoric.

And this was Stevenson, descending to the language of rhetorical violence that eight short months before he had publicly discarded as too late and too dangerous to continue. Perhaps it was both, but even Stevenson was getting used to being caught up by "things." One does not simply "return to dignified diplomatic usage"; one could only struggle—even if it seemed mostly in vain—to realize such idyllic worlds. Much to its credit, the new Administration appeared sensitive to what had happened in the United Nations, leading one reliable editorialist to report, "on good authority," that the Administration from President Kennedy on down had agreed, as it prepared for the opening of the Sixteenth Session in September, "that the nation must speak in a new voice and a new tone this fall."

It is not easy to judge whether the Kennedy administration developed either a new voice or a new tone, for the sudden death of Hammarskjöld on the very eve of the Sixteenth Session produced such a deep and diverting crisis that very little that anyone said could have been heard. Indeed, the only noise to rise above the cacophonous din was the fright-building boom of Soviet atomic explosions. Within a week after Hammarskjöld's death and the opening of the Sixteenth Session, President Kennedy came to the United Nations to make his bid in an elaborate speech. Despite the nearly universal praise it received—or perhaps in part because of it—the Kennedy address produced little more than a parade of glittering phrases only vaguely related to constructive thought on the issues of the day.

Perhaps there should be a pause here, to reflect upon the President's performance. We were besieged with slogans and clichés,

such as: "We prefer world law, in the age of self-determination, to world war in the age of mass extermination;" or, "the weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us"; or, once more on the arms theme, "For fifteen years this organization has sought the reduction and destruction of arms. Now that goal is no longer a dream; it is a practical matter of life and death." With these and other Wagnerian blasts and crescendos we were introduced to the new American disarmament proposals. It is difficult to discover what was particularly new, or what was even demonstrably American, about the list of headings misleadingly labelled as proposals.

Kennedy's more severe critics might have gathered the impression that, basically, the President was still running for office. Or does he really think in such clichés and slogans? Even the empty ones? On the other hand, perhaps it was a good speech, as speeches go; its most meaningful fault may have been that it was offered as a great speech. Nothing does more harm to a good speech than dressing it up in the raiments of greatness. Greatness is never self-conscious, and somehow Kennedy never appeared more so.

The South African Censure Issue

Having disposed of no less a personage than the President of the United States, perhaps we can call upon temerity to sustain us just long enough to do in his chief delegate to the United Nations—if no less unfairly. This has to do with the business of the South African censure, a monumental event that took place in the General Assembly on October 11, 1961. The action occurred after Eric Louw, the South African delegate, had addressed the Assembly in the General Debate. As was expected, the speech was largely an intense, emotion-ridden defense of the Union's racial policies. To the volatile Africans, sprinkled with such liberality around the General Assembly, the speech was offensive, leading them ultimately to the historic proposal of a resolution censuring the South African for his "insulting" and "racist" address. The vote on this unique resolution was 63-1-20.

Nine other states, including the United States, Britain and France, refused to join

even the 20 abstaining powers, arguing that they wished to register themselves as non-participants in order to show that they dissociated themselves entirely from the proceedings. After the unprecedented censure resolution had passed, Stevenson made clear the American position in the following forthright manner:

While we regret the views of the Foreign Minister of South Africa on the subject of apartheid and have so stated many times, we resolutely support his right—and the right of every speaker before the General Assembly to state his views.

We believe, in addition, that a motion of censure should have been given more serious and thoughtful consideration before action was taken.

This did not offer much solace to Louw, who bitterly reproached Stevenson for having failed to defend him from a vote of censure. Louw noted that the United States did not speak out when Liberia first demanded that the entire speech be stricken from the record, nor when this demand was dropped in favor of censure. As a matter of fact, Stevenson was not in the hall during either the morning or the afternoon of this dramatic event.

The point is that Stevenson spoke at the wrong time, and with the dilettantism of an arbiter, not a fighter. There was a moment for leadership, a role for heroes, an opportunity for greatness. The moment passed, unexploited. And why? Because Stevenson was away. But why was he away? Why, indeed, was he to be equipped merely with the invulnerable armor of convincing ex-

cuses? Why were we so sluggish and insensitive that we were both unwilling and unable to go down with Louw while he was fighting for his right to be heard?

It is, of course, an awkward moment. No administration will look well while it is unsure of itself or of the wisdom of its hard-won assessments. Kennedy entered the presidency with little more than academic interest in the United Nations. Through the power of the Stevenson image as it first played upon our relations to the underdeveloped world, and through the brilliant (if ultimately perilous) leadership of Dag Hammarskjöld, Kennedy apparently became a convert. One cannot read his United Nations speech of September 25, 1961, without wondering how the blueprint of utopia described therein could seriously be related to the world in which we were living. Having turned so uncritically to the formulas of international organization, he seemed psychologically unprepared to back away from them after the death of Hammarskjöld had revealed their perils.

Since we started with C. L. Sulzberger, so shall we end. In the words of one of his recent editorials:

As we seek to put in U.N.'s hands more international governance of national interests, we also see more nations in that body voting against us on important questions. . . . Thus by giving U.N. more authority and at the same time watching our own authority diminish in U.N. we edge toward an uncomfortable position. A few years hence we may desperately try to extricate ourselves.

(Continued from p. 35)

*are more interested in achieving a decent standard of living than in following the standards of either East or West.*²⁴ A passage in the Democratic platform of 1960 promised to help "these awakening, developing nations to evolve their own free choice."²⁵

Neither the Kennedy administration nor the African nations—nor, indeed, other nations—have freedom of choice in 1962. Except the choice of the lesser of several

evils. The major powers have committed serious blunders: France and Britain in invading the Suez Canal zone; the U.S.S.R. in being the first to renew atmospheric testing of thermonuclear bombs; the United States in declaring, through Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen Williams, "Africa for the Africans." The young African nations have made and will make blunders, blunders of less magnitude because they possess less power. In their quest for "freedom of choice," a more and more elusive chimera, they deserve understanding, not ridicule; sympathy, not condemnation.

²⁴ American Society of African Culture, *Summary Report, Second Annual Conference, June 26-29, 1959* (New York, 1959), pp. 8-10. Italics as in the original.

²⁵ *The New York Times*, July 12, 1960, Section 1, p. 21.

Current Documents

The Kennedy-Nehru Communiqué

With an increase in world tension during the last months of 1961, U.S. President John F. Kennedy looked for ways to meet the challenge. During this time, he conferred with many world leaders. On November 9, 1961, after a 4-day conference between Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and President Kennedy, to discuss international problems, a joint communiqué was issued. The full text of the communiqué follows:

The President and the Prime Minister have had four days of especially pleasant and rewarding conversations. These began in Newport, Rhode Island, on Monday, were continued for several hours Tuesday morning with senior Indians and United States officials present, with further private discussions Wednesday, and a brief final meeting today.

Subjects covered amount almost to a map of the troubled areas of the world. The problems of getting a peaceful settlement in Berlin, of securing the peace and liberties of the people of Southeast Asia, the problems of control of nuclear testing and disarmament, of the Congo, on how to strengthen the United Nations, and of United States and Indo-Pakistan relations were among the topics.

Prime Minister Nehru used the occasion to go deeply into the philosophic and historical background of Indian foreign policy. The President similarly went into the goals and objectives of American foreign policy as they have been molded and shaped over the years.

The President and the Prime Minister examined in particular those areas where peace is threatened. They discussed the dangers inherent in recent developments in Berlin and Southeast Asia.

Concerning Berlin, President Kennedy reaffirmed the United States commitment to support the freedom and economic viability of the two and one-quarter million people of West Berlin and the President and the Prime Minister concurred in the legitimate and necessary right of access to Berlin.

The President also assured the Prime Minister that every effort would be made to seek

a solution of the Berlin problem by peaceful means, and underlined the importance of the choices of the people directly concerned.

With respect to Southeast Asia, the President and the Prime Minister confirmed that it is the common objective of the United States and India that Laos be a genuinely neutral state, free of domination by any foreign power, and that each nation in the area have the opportunity to make its own choice of the course it will take in seeking to solve pressing economic and social problems under conditions of peace.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed India's efforts for the improved well-being of her people. The President reaffirmed the United States' interest in the success of this great effort.

They exchanged views on the desirability of a cessation of nuclear testing. The President referred in this connection to the recent resumption of tests by the Soviet Union, which broke the previous moratorium, and reaffirmed the United States unwillingness to accept a further uncontrolled nuclear test moratorium.

The Prime Minister and the President agreed on the urgent need for a treaty banning nuclear tests with necessary provision for inspection and control.

The President and Prime Minister stressed the high importance of measures to avoid the risk of war and of negotiations in this connection to achieve agreement on a program of general and complete disarmament.

India and the United States share in the fullest measure their common objective to develop the United Nations as the most effective instrument of world peace.

The President and the Prime Minister

reviewed the United States and Indian contributions to United Nations operations in the Congo, which they regard as an illustration of how that body, even under extremely difficult conditions, can help bring about conditions for the peaceful resolution of conflict.

Both the Prime Minister and the President strongly share the hope that as the result of the efforts of the people of the Congo and the United Nations a peaceful and united Congo will be achieved. The President expressed his special appreciation of the role played by the Indian soldiers in the Congo, who comprise more than one-third of the United Nations force there.

The Prime Minister and the President noted the cooperation and exchange of information between United States and Indian scientists in space science research. They agreed that this activity, which has the aim of peaceful exploitation of outer space for the benefit of mankind, could be usefully developed.

The Prime Minister and the President consider that their talks have been highly useful in the pursuit of their common objectives of an enduring world peace and enhanced understanding between the governments of India and the United States. They intend to keep closely in touch with each other in the months and years ahead.

The U.S.-Korean Communiqué

On November 14, 1961, after a meeting in the United States between South Korean General Chung Hee Park, leader of the military government of his country, and President Kennedy, the two leaders issued a communiqué outlining the results of their talk.

Chairman Park and President Kennedy concluded today a friendly and constructive exchange of views on the current situation in Korea and the Far East and the various matters of interest to the Governments and peoples of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America. Foreign Minister Choi [Duk Shin], Secretary Rusk and other officials of the two Governments participated in the conversations.

The two leaders reaffirmed the strong bonds of friendship traditionally existing between the two countries and their determination to intensify their common efforts toward the establishment of world peace based on freedom and justice.

The chairman reviewed the situation in Korea which led to the military revolution of May 16 and set forth the achievements made by the Revolutionary Government.

He emphasized the positive steps taken by the Government for social reform and economic stability, particularly the new Government's actions to reform the civil service, rationalize tax collections, abolish usury in local areas, increase employment opportunities, stimulate investment and expand both domestic and foreign trade.

He emphasized as well the positive steps taken by the Government in strengthening the nation against communism and in eliminating corruption and other social evils.

The President welcomed Chairman Park's full exposition of the current situation in the Republic of Korea and expressed his gratification at the many indications of progress made by the new Government of the republic.

The Chairman reiterated the solemn pledge of the Revolutionary Government to return the Government to civilian control in the summer of 1963, as he declared in the statement made on August 12, 1961. The President particularly expressed his satisfaction with the Korean Government's intention to restore civilian government at the earliest possible date.

The two leaders discussed the position of Korea in the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, and in this connection reviewed the continuing contribution of United States economic and military assistance to the strengthening of the Korean nation.

Recognizing that the successful achieve-

(Continued on p. 52)

Received at our Desk

Education . . .

GOVERNMENT AND EDUCATION. A COMPLETE DISCUSSION AND DEBATE MANUAL. EDITED BY BOWER ALY. (Columbia, Mo.: Artcraft Press, 1961. Library edition in 2 vols., 424 pages, reading list and index, \$5.00.)

This excellent guide for students and all citizens interested in the problem of American education is a two-part analysis of the role the federal government has played and should play in our educational system. The first part discusses the background of government and education; the arguments for and against federal aid to education; the relationship between the government and the school systems of the nation.

In a group of excellent articles, it is difficult to select one or two for special mention. The arguments for and against federal aid to education are well balanced and informative. Edward Rogge offers debaters and general readers an objective and coherent outline of the factors involved in our educational system: the problems of segregation, of private schools, of local autonomy. The goals to be achieved and the various possible solutions are discussed briefly, in this almost indispensable introduction to the problem of government's role. The historic background of the federal government's role in this area is informatively outlined by I. L. Kandel, whose discussion of "Federal Participation in Education" merits special attention from serious readers.

Part two discusses factors involved in federal aid in more detail: the rationale for national education, the problems of religion and education, the problem of higher education, the need for federal financial aid. *Government and Education* offers a great deal of thoughtful information for those concerned with congressional handling of this problem in 1962. Editor Bower Aly is to be congratulated for the high quality of the writing and the judicious selection of material in this all-inclusive handbook.

C.L.T.

FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION. EDITED BY RONALD STEEL. (New York: H. W. Wilson Co., 1961. Reference Shelf. Vol. 33, No. 4. 207 pages with bibliography, \$2.50.)

This collection of articles, reprinted from various publications, is focused on the role of the federal government in education, the National University Extension Association debate topic for 1961-1962. This little book will be of interest to the concerned citizen as well as to debaters.

Ronald Steel has done an excellent job of including both points of view on this very controversial subject. The selections are well edited and equal weight is given to supporters and opponents of federal aid to education. The thorny issue of aid for parochial education is also argued pro and con. In addition there is an essay on the sobering thought that money may not be the panacea for all education's ills.

The volume is organized into five sections, each prefaced by Steel. The sections include "The Challenge Facing Education," "The Question of Federal Aid," "Public Aid to Parochial Schools," "Aiding Higher Education," and the "New Strategy."

The material provided here is extremely stimulating. It is hoped that this book will draw a wider readership from taxpayers, parents and educators. Student debaters are certain to benefit from Ronald Steel's useful volume.

J.B.A.

History and Politics . . .

THE NEW FRANCE. BY EDWARD R. TANNENBAUM. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961. 252 pages, \$5.00.)

Here is a new type of study of a nation, focussed on a four-dimensional France with the fourth dimension—time—receiving its proportionate emphasis in a treatment of the present. The author tries to describe and analyze that intangible called the soul of France. To some extent he wants to be a late twentieth-century André Siegfried and should be

placed on that level. For Tannenbaum has spent 30 years living with the French, observing, studying and sharing in their cultural folkways and vicissitudes. In ten delightful chapters he carries the reader along by philosophical motifs through France's historical background, her bourgeois Malthusianism, her provincial commonsense, her anti-technological humanism, and the failure of her "Isms," to critiques of her literature, arts, folk culture and mass culture.

While those who know and love France will find new insights and those less well acquainted with our transatlantic "puzzlement" will come to know her much better, there are places where the author might disappoint his specialized reader. To the economist he would seem not to give enough emphasis to France's earlier lag in industrialization (only a paragraph). Yet this delay explains a great deal about

the French character and inferiority complex of the mid-twentieth century. To the sociologist, Tannenbaum might appear not to value sufficiently the spirit of compromise in human relations when he says that Center coalitions neglected social reforms. They did preserve the democratic republic, but you cannot expect the achievement of a complete reformist program when more than half the country is conservative. It is not quite correct to say that the Bonapartist monarchs refused to accept popular sovereignty and nationalism.

It is easy to find isolated points of disagreement with such a sweeping treatment, but as a whole this study is sound and penetrating and will bring a better understanding of France and the French to those who read it.

LYNN M. CASE
University of Pennsylvania

(Continued from p. 50)

ment of Korean economic development in accordance with a long-range plan is indispensable to build a democratic foundation and to maintain a strong anti-Communist posture in Korea, the President expressed great interest in Korea's draft five-year economic development plan. In this connection, he assured the Chairman that the United States Government would continue to extend all possible economic aid and cooperation to the Republic of Korea in order to further such long-range economic development.

The Chairman and the President discussed the problem of mutual defense against the threat of external armed aggression in the Pacific area. They recognized that the common interest of their two countries as bulwarks of the Free World against Communist expansion is deepened and reinforced by the fact that Korean and United States troops are brothers-in-arms, standing side by side in the United Nations command for the defense of Korean soil.

The President reaffirmed the determination of the United States to render forthwith and effectively all possible assistance to the Republic of Korea, in accordance with the mutual defense treaty between the Republic

of Korea and the United States of America signed on October 1, 1953, including the use of armed forces, if there is a renewal of armed attack.

The two leaders recalled that Korea had been successfully defended against armed aggression by the first collective military measures pursuant to the call of the United Nations. They recalled the declarations by United Nations members whose military forces participated in the Korean action, including their affirmation that in the interests of world peace, "if there is a renewal of armed attack, challenging again the principles of the United Nations, we would again be united and prompt to resist."

The Chairman and the President reaffirmed their faith in the United Nations, and their determination to seek the unification of Korea in freedom through peaceful means under the principles laid down and reaffirmed by the United Nations General Assembly.

Chairman Park and President Kennedy expressed their deep satisfaction with their meeting and discussions and reiterated their resolve to continue to serve the cause of freedom and democracy, and to strengthen the friendly ties between their two peoples.

The Month in Review

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin Crisis

Nov. 1—West Berlin policemen check the identity of persons traveling in Soviet bloc diplomatic cars from East to West Berlin. Formerly, Soviet bloc envoys had enjoyed free access to West Berlin.

Nov. 4—East German police follow and detain 4 U.S. army trucks making a routine patrol of East Berlin, among several other harassments by East Germans and Russians against the Allied Powers in West Berlin.

Nov. 7—At a reception in the Kremlin Palace to commemorate the 44th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet Premier Khrushchev declares that the Soviet Union is willing to postpone settlement of the Berlin crisis.

Nov. 9—Meeting in Washington, U.S. President Kennedy and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru issue a communiqué upholding the Western right to free access to Berlin.

All news agency dispatches from Moscow report that the Soviet Union has modified its stand on Berlin. U.S. officials state that no new proposal has been received.

Nov. 16—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declares that Ambassador to the Soviet Union Hans Kroll did not act beyond his powers in talks November 9 with Khrushchev in Moscow on the Berlin situation.

Nov. 19—West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer arrives in the U.S. for a 3-day conference with U.S. President Kennedy.

East German soldiers and workmen fortify the East-West Berlin wall with tank traps.

Nov. 22—Kennedy and Adenauer issue a communiqué reaffirming their adherence to "a peaceful resolution" of the Berlin crisis. They agree that the Berlin question should be negotiated with the U.S.S.R.

Disarmament

Nov. 6—The General Assembly votes 71 to

20 to ask the atomic powers to refrain from nuclear testing. The U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain have warned they will ignore the resolution.

Nov. 8—The General Assembly votes 71 to 11 to ask the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain to resume nuclear test ban treaty negotiations.

Nov. 13—The U.S. and Britain ask the U.S.S.R. to reopen negotiations for a nuclear weapons test ban treaty.

Nov. 15—The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each ask for further disarmament negotiations; the U.S.S.R. calls for a disarmament treaty by June 1, 1962.

Nov. 21—The U.S.S.R. agrees to reconvene the Geneva test ban treaty conference.

Nov. 24—Despite U.S. protests, the General Assembly passes two resolutions opposing the use of nuclear weapons and asking for the denuclearization of Africa. The U.S. asks instead for binding treaties and inspection.

Nov. 27—The U.S.S.R. suggests an immediate voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space and underground, pending an international control system.

Nov. 28—The U.S. says that the Russian proposal for a nuclear test moratorium without international inspection is "completely, totally, absolutely unsatisfactory and unacceptable."

The General Assembly asks the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to establish a new agency to negotiate general complete disarmament.

Nov. 30—The Political Committee votes by acclamation to approve a resolution asking an international agreement to restrict nuclear weapons to those nations that already possess them.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Nov. 8—Negotiations begin in Brussels on British entry to the Common Market community.

Nov. 22—British and Common Market experts begin to study the obstacles blocking

British membership in the Common Market.

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)

Nov. 27—Cabinet-rank ministers meet in Geneva for a 3-day session, focusing on 1) reducing tariffs on industrial goods, 2) trade in agricultural products, and 3) methods of augmenting exports from underdeveloped nations to industrialized nations.

Gatt members agree in principle to a new system of "across the board" or "linear" bargaining on tariff reduction. This would mean reduction of tariffs on whole categories of items, instead of reductions item by item.

International Labor Organization (I.L.O.)

Nov. 21—David A. Morse reveals his resignation as Director General of the I.L.O.

Nordic Conference

Nov. 12—The Premiers of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland agree in principle to work out a single treaty encompassing all existing cooperation agreements among the Nordic nations.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)

Nov. 13—Supreme Nato Commander General Lauris Norstad reveals that Nato's divisions will number 25 in the critical Central European sector. Almost all will be combat ready.

Nov. 16—In a talk with American reporters, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer suggests that Nato be authorized to order use of atomic weapons without prior authorization from the U.S. President.

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.)

Nov. 16—The 20 members of O.E.C.D. compromise on a plan for a 50 per cent rise in their total production over a 10-year period. The U.S. had urged the 50 per cent goal for a 9-year period, against British objection.

Organization of American States (O.A.S.)

Nov. 15—Albert Zuleta Angel of Colombia is unanimously elected chairman of the Council of the O.A.S. El Salvador's Francisco Roberto Lima is named vice-president.

Nov. 22—The O.A.S. Council hears a Cuban accusation that the U.S. is guilty of "armed intervention" in the Dominican Republic. (See also *Dominican Republic*.)

Nov. 26—An O.A.S. observer group ends its study of the Dominican Republic.

United Nations (See also *Disarmament*)

Nov. 3—U Thant of Burma is unanimously elected as Acting Secretary General of the United Nations by the U.N. General Assembly.

Nov. 4—In Rome, the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization (F.A.O.) opens a 3-week session on the use of surplus foods for underdeveloped areas.

Nov. 14—When the General Assembly's Trusteeship Committee votes to allow 2 Africans from Portuguese Guiana and the Cape Verde Islands to testify, Portugal walks out.

Nov. 15—U Thant authorizes U.N. officials in the Congo to "take every measure possible" to restore law and order. (See also *Congo*.)

Nov. 22—Cuba asks the U.N. Security Council to censor the U.S. as an aggressor in the Dominican Republic. (See also *Dominican Republic*.)

Nov. 23—The Special Political Committee asks for further Austrian-Italian negotiation over the Alto Adige dispute.

Nov. 24—The Security Council authorizes U Thant to move against "mercenaries" and other foreigners in Katanga, using force if necessary. U.S. suggestions for training the Congolese army and authorizing the use of force against any rebellious movements in the Congo are defeated. The U.S. votes for the African-Asian resolution "with the greatest reluctance."

The leader of the Dominican Opposition party tells the Security Council that the U.S. has not been aggressive against the Dominican Republic.

Despite Russian pleas of poverty, the Budgetary Committee of the General Assembly raises the Russian share of the U.N.'s administrative budget from 13.62 to 14.97 per cent of the total.

Nov. 25—Dr. Joseph E. Johnson reports to the U.N. as head of a Middle East mission after a 3-week tour of the Middle East;

he believes both sides may consider a step by step process toward progress on the Arab refugee problem.

Nov. 27—The U.S. offers a plan for cooperative space exploration to the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

The General Assembly sets up a 17-man committee to investigate compliance with a resolution of last year that called for "immediate steps" to offer independence to colonial peoples. The vote is 97-0.

Nov. 28—The Assembly votes to condemn South African apartheid policies.

The Security Council ends its hearing of Cuban charges that the U.S. was an aggressor in the recent crisis in the Dominican Republic.

Nov. 30—Voting in the Security Council, the U.S.S.R. vetoes the admission of Kuwait to the U.N.

AFGHANISTAN

Nov. 12—Afghan Foreign Minister Muhammad Naim declares that Pakistani troops are massing on Afghanistan's northern frontier.

ALBANIA

Nov. 9—A speech by the Albanian Communist leader, General Enver Hoxha, is monitored in Europe. Hoxha rebuts Soviet Premier Khrushchev's criticisms of Albania, made in Moscow last month at the Soviet Communist party congress.

Nov. 17—An advance group of Albanian economists arrives in Peking. *Hsinhua*, Communist Chinese press agency, declares that China and Albania will confer on economic cooperation for 1962.

BAHREIN

Nov. 2—Sheik Sulman bin Hamad Al Khalifa dies. His son, Sheik Isa bin Sulman al Khalifa, succeeds his father as ruler of this Persian Gulf sheikdom.

BRAZIL

Nov. 23—Foreign Minister San Tiago Dantas announces that Brazil and the Soviet Union have resumed diplomatic ties, broken off in 1947. The Chamber of Deputies, where the announcement is made, receives the news with boos.

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Ceylon

Nov. 16—It is revealed in Colombo that the Government has lodged a "strong protest" with the U.S. and Britain because of their "indiscriminate sales of rubber" from their stockpiles; these sales tend to disrupt the rubber market and depress prices.

Ghana

Nov. 3—Parliament passes legislation retroactive to March 6, 1957, making critics of Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah living abroad accountable in Ghanaian courts.

Nov. 4—Nkrumah's statue in Accra is damaged by dynamite explosions.

Nov. 9—Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh are welcomed warmly in Accra on a visit to West Africa.

Nov. 13—An opposition leader charges in Parliament that over 1,000 opponents of the Government have been arrested recently.

Nov. 25—Nkrumah becomes first chancellor of the University of Ghana.

Great Britain

Nov. 2—The Government reduces the bank rate by one-half of one per cent for the second time in 4 weeks; the new rate is 6 per cent.

Nov. 3—Princess Margaret bears a son, Viscount Linley, who will be fifth in line for the British throne.

Nov. 10—Prime Minister of the West Indies Sir Grantley Adams says that it is doubtful the Commonwealth can "survive the repercussions" of British immigration restrictions now being proposed in London.

Nov. 25—Prime Minister Harold Macmillan confers in London with French President Charles de Gaulle.

India

Nov. 6—Premier Jawaharlal Nehru confers with U.S. President Kennedy in Washington.

Nov. 12—Nehru arrives in Los Angeles and tours Disneyland.

Appearing in a pre-taped television program with U.S. delegate to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson, Nehru acknowledges that the

resumption of nuclear testing by the U.S.S.R. was "completely wrong."

Nov. 20—New Delhi warns Western oil companies that arrangements are being made to replace their supply of refined petroleum products elsewhere, because of an "implied threat" from the companies to restrict India's supply of refined oil. The Standard Vacuum Oil Company of the U.S. and the Burmah Shell interests (British) are protesting an Indian government decision to reduce the selling prices of refined oil products.

India publishes a note protesting "further aggression" by China along their common border.

Nov. 27—Nehru reports to Parliament, terming his conversations with President Kennedy cordial and useful.

Malaya

Nov. 20—Tengku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, begins conferences in London about the possible incorporation of Singapore, British North Borneo and Malaya in a new federation.

Nigeria

Nov. 22—Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa reveals that a 6-year old ban on Communist literature is to be raised December 1.

Pakistan

Nov. 25—President Mohammad Ayub Khan reveals his decision to refer the Kashmir dispute to the U.N.

BRITISH EMPIRE

British Guiana

Nov. 3—Prime Minister Cheddi B. Jagan tells the Legislative Assembly that the U.S. did not agree to his request for financial aid and in effect told him to look elsewhere.

Nov. 4—In Washington, U.S. officials concede that Jagan was not promised any specific aid but deny that he was refused aid and told to find it elsewhere.

Nov. 15—Jagan reveals he plans to go to London within three weeks to ask the government there to receive a delegation in

1962 to set a date for British Guiana's independence.

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland

Nov. 5—Sir Edgar Whitehead, Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, says it is not accurate to say that Southern Rhodesia practices racial discrimination similar to South African apartheid. The charge was made at the U.N.

Kenya

Nov. 6—Former Mau Mau leader Jomo Kenyatta (now leader of the Kenya African National Union) arrives in London to talk to British colonial officials.

Nov. 10—Kenyatta says he is satisfied with the results of his London conference.

Nov. 15—Governor of Kenya Sir Patrick Renison asks for aid in the "grave emergency" caused by flood and famine.

Nov. 28—Colonial Secretary Reginald Maudling reveals that a conference on constitutional changes in Kenya will start in London on February 14.

Singapore

Nov. 22—Tengku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, and the British government support the suggested merger of Singapore with the Federation.

CAMBODIA

Nov. 17—Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk invites South Vietnam to set up a commission to see whether Vietnamese Communist guerrillas are operating from bases in Cambodia. South Vietnam has charged that invading Communist guerrillas are using bases in Cambodia.

Nov. 21—It is reported that a 4-day inspection tour of the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border has failed to verify charges of Communist guerrilla bases on Cambodian soil. (See also *South Vietnam*.)

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Nov. 3—Dr. Sture C. Linner, head of the U.N. Congo operation, warns Katanga against bombing attacks in Kasai province. He warns that U.N. planes will take "all necessary counter-action" if Kantangese

planes continue to strafe areas within Kasai.

Nov. 5—It is reported that last week 15 white women were raped by Congolese soldiers at Luluabourg in Kasai Province.

Nov. 8—The Soviet delegate (and U.N. Security Council President for the month), Valerian A. Zorin, calls a meeting of the Security Council for November 13 to discuss the situation in the Congo.

Nov. 13—Congolese Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko asks the U.N. Security Council for assistance in returning Katanga Province to national Congo rule.

Nov. 14—A report by a U.N. investigating committee, looking into the death of Patrice Lumumba and two of his aides, is released. The report accuses Katanga Province of contributing "directly or indirectly, to the murder of the prisoners [Lumumba and his aides were under the custody of Katanga President Moise Tshombe]."

Nov. 15—Congolese troops loyal to Eastern Province mutiny in Kivu Province. The mutinous soldiers hold 13 Italians who are part of the U.N. force in the Congo. It is reported that the mutiny was incited by Vice-Premier Antoine Gizenga in an effort to gain control of the central government.

Nov. 16—It is announced that the 13 captured Italian airmen have been murdered by mutinous troops in Kivu.

Nov. 17—Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak tells the U.N. Security Council that Belgium has told Tshombe to end his secession from the Congo. He declares that Belgium opposes Katanga's secession.

Nov. 24—The U.N. Security Council approves an Afro-Asian resolution, 9-0 (2 abstentions), empowering the acting Secretary General to use force if necessary to rid Katanga of white aides.

Nov. 25—The U.N. abandons plans to disarm 2,000 Congolese troops at Kindu in a search for the mutinous soldiers who murdered 13 Italians. The U.N. agrees to a Central Congolese plan to remove the guilty soldiers to another city before punishing them.

Nov. 27—Foreign Minister Justin Bomboko and U.N. acting Secretary General U Thant sign an agreement giving U.N. forces in the Congo complete freedom of movement.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Nov. 18—The Dominican government announces that General Rafael L. Trujillo has resigned as chief of the armed forces. Trujillo departs for Europe.

Nov. 19—President Joaquin Balaguer broadcasts a nation-wide speech; he declares that the 2 brothers of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo, both of whom recently returned to the Dominican Republic, have agreed to leave.

U.S. naval vessels are sailing from Florida to join other ships patrolling Dominican waters. There are 1800 Marines aboard these naval ships in Dominican waters. It is reported "on the highest authority" that they will be ordered to land if Balaguer is in danger.

Balaguer appoints himself commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Nov. 21—Crowds numbering more than 100,000 cheer the return from the U.S. of Viriato A. Fiallo, president of the National Civic Union, and Manuel Tavarez, head of the 14th of June movement. The 2 leaders represent the firm opposition to the Trujillo family; they have urged that O.A.S. sanctions against the Dominican Republic be continued until all elements of the Trujillo dictatorship have been eradicated.

A 5-nation committee of observers from the O.A.S. arrives to investigate the Dominican situation.

Nov. 22—Balaguer tells an investigating team from the O.A.S. that he is in control of the situation in the Dominican Republic.

Nov. 23—The Dominican congress votes to change the name of the capital from Ciudad Trujillo to Santo Domingo.

Nov. 28—A general strike cripples the Dominican Republic. It was called by a united opposition bloc seeking to force Balaguer out and to replace him by a ruling junta.

Nov. 30—Violence continues. Balaguer meets with military leaders who insist that any junta to replace the present Balaguer government must be headed by Balaguer. The opposition declares such a junta is not satisfactory.

ECUADOR

Nov. 6—Some 14 persons are killed in anti-government rioting in Guayaquil. The Ecuadoran Cabinet resigns. President José Maria Velasco accuses Vice-President Carlos Julio Arosemena Monroy of trying to take over the country. In a broadcast to his countrymen, Velasco declares that he no longer recognizes Arosemena as the vice-president.

Nov. 7—A 7-hour anti-government demonstration in Quito is quelled by government forces. Arosemena is arrested. Sources report that Velasco has fled.

Nov. 8—In a conflict over Velasco's successor to the presidency, the Ecuadoran air force attacks Quito and forces its candidate for the presidency, Arosemena, upon the army. The army supported Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Camilo Gallegos Toledo, for the presidential office.

Nov. 9—Arosemena is sworn in as president.

Nov. 12—Velasco arrives in Argentina as an exile.

Nov. 13—Congress elects Lieutenant Colonel Reinaldo Varea Donoso as vice-president.

EGYPT

Nov. 10—Egypt and the U.S. sign an agreement: the U.S. will ship foodstuffs to Egypt, faced with large crop failures this year. Cairo will pay the U.S. the equivalent of \$20.5 million.

Nov. 19—Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Yugoslav President Tito and Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru confer for over 3 hours in Cairo.

Nov. 20—A communiqué, the result of a 3-power conference yesterday, is issued: the 3 leaders affirm their desire for preserving world peace.

Nov. 25—At the opening session of the new Preparatory Committee for a National Congress of Popular Powers, Nasser charges the group with the responsibility of preparing the way for general and free elections, a constitutional assembly, and a democratically elected parliament.

FINLAND

Nov. 3—President Urho Kekkonen returns home after a 24-day trip to the U.S. and Canada.

Nov. 5—Kekkonen, in a radio and television broadcast about his North American trip, declares that the recent Soviet note requesting defense talks with Finland does not infringe on Finnish neutrality.

On October 30, the Soviet Union, in a note to Finland, declared that the threat of aggression by West Germany was grounds for invoking the Soviet-Finnish mutual defense treaty of 1948. Consultation was requested.

Nov. 14—President Kekkonen moves up elections scheduled for next summer to February 4 and 5. It is announced in Helsinki that the Soviet government has asked for assurances that Finland's foreign policy will remain unchanged.

Nov. 23—President Kekkonen arrives in Novosibirsk in Siberia to consult with Soviet Premier Khrushchev on the Soviet note asking for joint defense talks.

Nov. 25—In a communiqué issued today, the U.S.S.R. declares that it is willing to postpone military talks. The communiqué resulted from yesterday's conference between Khrushchev and Kekkonen. (See also U.S.S.R., Nov. 17.)

Nov. 26—Kekkonen reports to the Finnish people on his talk with Khrushchev. He states that all political opposition leaders who have earned Moscow's enmity should leave politics.

Nov. 28—It is officially announced that an economic agreement was signed last week between Finland and the U.S.S.R.; it provides for a 25 per cent increase in trade.

FRANCE

Nov. 24—President Charles de Gaulle, in Britain, confers with British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on the Berlin crisis and on British membership in the European Economic Community.

Nov. 28—Some 500,000 railway, electricity and gas workers stage a one-day strike to press for wage increases.

FRANCE OVERSEAS

Algeria

Nov. 1—Some 86 persons are dead and 150 are wounded in demonstrations marking the seventh anniversary of the Algerian rebellion.

Nov. 12—A Muslim Senator to the French Senate is assassinated in Algiers.

A hunger strike by Mohammed Ben Bella and 4 colleagues, all members of the Algerian national liberation movement, enters its twelfth day. (See also *Morocco*.)

The Algerian Provisional Government, with its headquarters in Tunis, refuses to resume negotiations with France on peace in Algeria while several of its leaders are imprisoned with the status of criminal prisoners.

Nov. 15—The U.N. General Assembly approves a resolution, 62-0, asking France to give imprisoned Algerian rebel leaders the status of political prisoners.

Nov. 16—French Minister of Justice Bernard Chenot in a radio-television broadcast declares that all persons detained because of the Algerian war are political prisoners.

Over 1,000 African, Asian and Russian students in Moscow demonstrate before the French Embassy with shouts of "freedom for Algeria."

Nov. 19—The hunger strike by 4,000 imprisoned Algerian rebels ends after 19 days when they are assured of being treated as political prisoners.

Nov. 20—The 5 Algerian rebel ministers end their hunger strike after a compromise plan is worked out whereby they will be placed in a convalescent home. There, the Algerians will be attended by Moroccan physicians and will be supervised by a representative of Moroccan King Hassan II. France retains general custody of the 5 Algerians.

Nov. 26—A wave of violence that began yesterday sweeps Algeria. It is disclosed that some 15 persons are dead and over 90 are injured in clashes between Europeans and Muslims.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

Nov. 2—Chancellor Adenauer's attempts to form a coalition government between his Christian Democratic Union and Erich Mende's Free Democrats are not progressing. In addition, Christian Democratic deputies from Berlin protest the succession of Interior Minister Gerhard Schroeder (Christian Democrat) as for-

eign minister, replacing Heinrich von Brentano.

Nov. 3—Adenauer and other Christian Democratic Union leaders agree to the Free Democrats' demand that the original agreement between Mende and Adenauer be accepted unchanged.

Nov. 4—The Christian Democratic Union's parliamentary group approves the agreement for a coalition government with Erich Mende's Free Democrats.

Nov. 7—The Bundestag approves the nomination of Adenauer by a vote of 258-206 (26 abstentions and 9 absentees).

Nov. 14—The new West German coalition government is sworn in. Ludwig Erhard remains as Economics Minister. Gerhard Schroeder becomes Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Nov. 28—The West German government announces that it will delay the release of 35,000 soldiers for 3 months. The soldiers were due for release at the end of 1961. (See also *Int'l., Berlin*.)

GREECE

Nov. 2—Premier Constantine Caramanlis is asked by King Paul to form a new government. Caramanlis' National Radical Union was victorious in the elections last Sunday.

Nov. 4—Caramanlis and his new Cabinet are sworn in.

ISRAEL

Nov. 2—The Israeli Knesset (Parliament) approves the new coalition government headed by Premier David Ben-Gurion. The coalition is composed of 4 parties, Mapai, National Religious Front, Ahdut Avoda and Poalei Agudat Israel.

JAPAN

Nov. 2—An economic conference of 14 leading officials of the U.S. and Japan opens in Japan. Attending are U.S. Secretary of Commerce Luther H. Hodges and U.S. Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg. The conference will examine U.S.-Japanese trade. In the last year, Japan purchased \$900 million more in U.S. goods than it exported.

Nov. 12—The South Korean leader, General Chung Hee Park, and Japanese Premier

Hayato Ikeda confer in Tokyo on their mutual problems.

KOREA, SOUTH

Nov. 10—The South Korean ruling military junta pardons ex-premier John M. Chang and his Cabinet. Last May the Chang government was overthrown. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Nov. 13—South Korean General Chung Hee Park arrives in the U.S. for a 10-day visit.

LAOS

Nov. 9—After an hour and fifteen minute talk between U.S. President Kennedy and Indian Prime Minister Nehru in the U.S., a joint communiqué is issued. The 2 leaders affirm that Laos' neutrality should be preserved.

Nov. 24—Representatives of the 3 rival Lao-tian factions fail to agree on a meeting of the 3 princes. The 3 factions cannot agree on security measures for safeguarding the rival princes when they meet.

MOROCCO

Nov. 14—Three Moroccan Ministers, representatives of King Hassan II, personally ask President de Gaulle to free 3 Algerian rebel leaders imprisoned since 1956. (See also *France Overseas, Algeria*.)

NORWAY

Nov. 22—At a luncheon at the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastas I. Mikoyan speaks out against West German militarism. He criticizes Norway's role in Nato. Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard M. Lange rebuts Mikoyan's criticism and defends West Germany and Nato.

PANAMA

Nov. 16—The National Assembly unanimously approves a resolution for drastic revision of treaties with the U.S. over the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone.

PHILIPPINES, THE

Nov. 14—National elections for the presidency and legislators are held.

Nov. 16—Unofficial returns give Liberal party candidate Diosdado Macapagal the winning number of votes over incumbent President Carlos P. Garcia. The Liberal party is also leading Garcia's National party candidates in the vice-presidential and legislative races.

POLAND

Nov. 12—The Polish Red Cross announces that West Germany will remunerate 73 Polish women, Nazi guinea pigs. This is the first indemnification of World War II victims living in Iron Curtain countries.

PORTUGAL

Nov. 7—The last opposition candidates remaining in the election scheduled for November 12 withdraw. Premier Antonio de Oliveira Salazar and his National Union will thus run in an uncontested election.

Nov. 10—Opponents of the Salazar regime kidnap a Portuguese airliner and force it to drop leaflets telling the Portuguese to rebel.

Nov. 12—Portuguese voters turn out about 70 per cent strong to support Salazar.

Nov. 21—Portuguese President Americo de Deus Rodrigues Tomas arrives in Spain for a 4-day visit.

Angola

Nov. 25—It is reported that rebels attacked a native village in northern Angola last night.

SENEGAL

Nov. 3—Senegalese President Leopold S. Senghor meets with U. S. President Kennedy in Washington.

SOUTH AFRICA, REPUBLIC OF

Nov. 2—Prime Minister Hendrick F. Verwoerd announces the appointments of 2 English speaking persons to his Cabinet. They are the first English-speaking men to be included in the Cabinet since 1948.

Nov. 3—The government announces that South African Chief Albert Luthuli will be allowed to go to Norway to receive the 1960 Nobel Peace Prize.

SWEDEN

Nov. 2—The Nobel Prizes in Science for 1961 are awarded: the chemistry prize is given to Melvin Calvin (U.S.) of the University of California at Berkeley; the physics prize is shared by Robert Hofstadter (U. S.) of Stanford University and Rudolf L. Moessbauer (Germany) of the California Institute of Technology.

SYRIA

Nov. 20—Premier Mamoun Kuzbari and 5 Cabinet members (one for reasons of

health) resign. They plan to run in the forthcoming elections.

Nov. 21—Minister of Education Izzat el-Nuss heads an all-civilian Cabinet of 10.

Nov. 24—Election campaigning for the 172 seats in the Constituent Assembly to be filled by election on December 1 begins.

TURKEY

Nov. 10—President Cemal Gursel names General Ismet Inonu to head a new government. Inonu's Republican People's party has the largest number of seats in the lower house of parliament.

Nov. 16—The Justice party announces that it will form a coalition government with Inonu.

Nov. 20—President Gursel announces the new coalition Cabinet composed of 11 members of the R.P.P. and 11 of the Justice party. Inonu is premier.

U.S.S.R., THE

Nov. 1—The Soviet people are informed of the removal of Stalin's body from the Lenin mausoleum in Red Square. His new grave is in the cemetery of heroes, near the Kremlin wall.

The Communist party announces that membership of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. has been increased by one-third; it is now composed of 175 full members.

Nov. 2—The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission announces that the Soviet Union has detonated 2 more nuclear explosions in the intermediate range, i.e., equivalent to 20,000–500,000 tons of TNT.

Nov. 5—*Tass*, Soviet press agency, publishes an authorized statement that Soviet testing will be extended if the U.S. tests in the atmosphere.

Nov. 7—Marshal Kliment Y. Voroshilov, former chief of state until his retirement last year, is barred from taking his place at the reviewing stand by a Soviet guard. The occasion is a parade in Red Square to celebrate the forty-fourth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution.

Nov. 10—Ex-Soviet Premier Vyacheslav M. Molotov and his wife leave Vienna for Moscow. Molotov is the permanent Soviet delegate to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Nov. 11—It is reported that Stalingrad has been renamed Volgograd.

It is reported by informed sources in Moscow that Molotov, Georgi M. Malenkov and Lazar M. Kaganovich have been ousted from the Communist party.

Nov. 13—Vladimir Y. Semichastny is named head of the Soviet security police. He replaces Aleksandr N. Shelepin, newly appointed national party secretary under Khrushchev.

Nov. 16—Alexander I. Alexandrov is named acting chief of the Soviet delegation to the I.A.E.A.

Nov. 17—The Finnish Ambassador in Moscow declares that yesterday he received a Russian request that mutual defense talks between the Soviet Union and Finland commence shortly. The Ambassador is in Helsinki to consult Finnish leaders. (See also *Finland*.)

Nov. 18—Informed sources report that intensive Warsaw Pact training maneuvers have begun in Western Poland.

Nov. 21—Foreign Minister Halvard M. Lange of Norway meets in Moscow with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

Nov. 19—Khrushchev's speech last week criticizing cotton farmers is published. Khrushchev declared that cotton yields per acre have declined steadily.

Nov. 24—A speech made by Khrushchev at a luncheon for President Kekkonen of Finland in Novosibirsk today is released in Moscow. In the speech Khrushchev criticizes West Germany and calls for Finnish-Soviet cooperation because of "the intensification of international tension."

Nov. 27—The U.S.S.R. puts forth a new proposal for ending nuclear tests. (See also *Int'l., Disarmament*.)

Nov. 28—*Izvestia* (official Soviet government newspaper) reprints the complete text of the interview given by U.S. President Kennedy on November 25 to Aleksei I. Adzhubei, *Izvestia's* editor. Kennedy accuses the Soviet Union of aggravating the world's crises, but expresses the hope that the Soviet and American people can live in peace. (See also *Int'l., Berlin*.)

UNITED STATES

Civil Rights

Nov. 16—The Civil Rights Commission reports on police lawlessness and brutality in

the United States and recommends corrective legislation to Congress.

Nov. 18—Attorney General Robert Kennedy is formally notified by the Communist party that it refuses to register as an arm of the U.S.S.R. under the 1950 Internal Security Act.

The Economy

Nov. 3—The Department of Labor's Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that the total of employed Americans reached 67,824,000 in October; the total unemployed was under 4 million, 6.8 per cent of the labor force.

Nov. 8—President Kennedy tells a news conference that the U.S. must now begin to rework its foreign trade policy.

Nov. 15—The President sets up a 23-member committee to study the problem of unemployment among the 16-21 year age group.

Nov. 28—The President orders the Treasury to stop selling its silver; he notes that in January he will ask Congress to repeal the law requiring the Treasury to buy silver.

Foreign Policy

Nov. 2—The President orders plans to be made for resuming nuclear tests in the atmosphere if these should prove necessary.

Nov. 4—Secretary of State Dean Rusk arrives in Seoul to talk with Korean government officials.

Nov. 6—Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru confers with the President at Newport, Rhode Island. They discuss South-east Asian problems. (See also *Intl., Berlin*, Nov. 9.)

The White House announces that Puerto Rican Teodoro Moscoso, now U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, is to be Latin-American area administrator of the Agency for International Development. In this post he will administer the 10-year plan, Alliance for Progress.

Nov. 14—Kennedy promises economic aid, and continued military assistance to South Korea, in a meeting with South Korean leader General Chung Hee Park.

Nov. 15—It is announced in Washington that U.S., British, French and West German foreign ministers will meet in Paris in December to discuss the Berlin crisis. This will be their third conference this year.

Nov. 18—Peace Corps Director R. Sargent Shriver reveals plans to send Peace Corps volunteers to Brazil, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela. These governments have invited the volunteers to serve.

Nov. 20—Talks open in Washington between President Kennedy and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. (See also *Intl., Berlin*, Nov. 22.)

The Agency for International Development advances \$50 million to Brazil; this is the first payment on a total credit commitment of \$100 million.

Nov. 21—Indian Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon calls on President Kennedy.

Nov. 26—Adlai Stevenson arrives in Trinidad to talk to Argentine President Arturo Frondizi.

Nov. 28—In an interview published in *Izvestia*, President Kennedy blames the Russian government for the Berlin crisis and tells the Russian people that their government resumed nuclear testing.

Nov. 29—Kennedy says that a "negotiated and mutually satisfactory agreement in regard to Berlin and Germany" is a prerequisite for lessening East-West tensions.

Government

Nov. 2—President Kennedy, the governors of Delaware, Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and the New York State Conservation Commissioner sign the Delaware River Pact to provide fuller development of the river basin's water resources.

Nov. 8—President Kennedy reveals that General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower will serve as board chairman of a new citizens' committee that will be concerned with the "People to People" program.

Nov. 9—Irvin Scarbeck is sentenced to 30 years in prison for passing secrets to Poland while serving in the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw.

Nov. 14—James J. Saxon is named Controller of the Currency, succeeding Ray M. Gidney.

Nov. 15—Kennedy leaves for a 3-day Far West tour of the U.S.

Nov. 16—House Speaker Sam Rayburn dies at the age of 79.

Nov. 22—It is announced by the White House that Lieutenant General Joseph M.

Swing will retire as Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization January 1. It is reported that he will be replaced by Associate Commissioner Raymond F. Farrell.

Nov. 26—Kennedy announces that Chester Bowles is to be replaced as Under Secretary of State by George W. Ball. W. Averell Harriman is named Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Eight other changes in State Department and White House staffs are revealed.

Republican Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire dies at 63.

Nov. 27—Chester Bowles is named special representative and advisor to the President on African, Asian and Latin-American affairs.

Nov. 29—John A. McCone is sworn in as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Nov. 30—The Bureau of the Census announces that at 3:01 P.M. the U.S. population reached 185 million; this is an addition of 5 million in the last year.

Labor

Nov. 2—The Chrysler Corporation and the United Automobile Workers agree on a 3-year contract.

The A.F.L.-C.I.O. gives a charter of affiliation to some 1700 Cincinnati milk delivery drivers who have rebelled against Hoffa's Teamsters Union.

Nov. 11—A. Philip Randolph, president of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters and the only Negro vice president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., accuses the labor organization of "moral paralysis, pessimism, and defeatism and cynicism" in racial policies.

Nov. 29—Cornelius J. Haggerty, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O.'s Building and Construction Trades department, says Walter Reuther is "treacherous and vindictive" and is trying to "kidnap" the jurisdiction of the building trades unions.

Military Affairs

Nov. 2—Major General Edwin Walker reveals he will resign from the Army. Walker was removed from command of a European infantry division last April because of charges that he used anti-Communist, troop-indoctrination courses to influence the voting of his men in the 1960 elections. He says that he intends "now,

as a civilian, to do what I have found it no longer possible to do in uniform."

Nov. 3—The Air Force reveals that the 350 million copper needles orbited October 21 have not yet been located by radar. The needles were intended to spread out in a copper wire belt around the earth for scientific purposes.

Nov. 4—The Army accepts General Walker's resignation.

Nov. 9—The New York state legislature approves Governor Rockefeller's \$100 million fall-out shelter program.

The X-15 sets a speed record at 4,070 miles an hour.

Nov. 10—An Atlas rocket carrying a monkey veers off course and is destroyed by the Air Force.

Nov. 13—The President asks for revision of the nation's air traffic control system.

Nov. 17—A Minuteman missile is launched from a pit 90 feet deep.

Nov. 22—The Air Force launches a satellite secretly and does not divulge any information about it.

The Department of Defense issues a memorandum reminding the military branches that reservists have a right to win deferments or exemptions from active duty because of family hardship.

Nov. 25—The nuclear powered aircraft carrier *Enterprise* is commissioned; this is the world's largest ship.

Nov. 28—The Department of Defense makes it known that it plans a Regular Army with 16 instead of 14 combat divisions.

Hanson Baldwin of *The New York Times* reports that a secret Pentagon committee report urges a single supreme commander for U.S. forces all over the world.

Nov. 29—The National Aeronautics and Space Administration announces that a chimpanzee has orbited the earth twice and returned safely in a Project Mercury space capsule. The first human pilot to fly in orbit will be John H. Glenn, Jr.

Politics

Nov. 2—President Kennedy appears personally in Trenton to support Richard J. Hughes for governor of New Jersey.

Kennedy appears in New York city to support Mayor Robert Wagner's re-election as mayor.

Nov. 4—Henry B. Gonzales, liberal Demo-

crat, wins San Antonio's congressional election; he was supported by Kennedy.
Nov. 7—Mayor Wagner wins re-election as New York's mayor.

Richard Hughes is elected Governor of New Jersey defeating former Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell, a Republican supported by former President Eisenhower.

Republican William O. Cowger wins the mayoralty election in Louisville, Kentucky.

Democrat Albert S. Harrison is elected governor of Virginia; Harrison has the backing of the Byrd machine.

Nov. 13—Mayor Wagner reveals that he is handling patronage for the Kennedy administration in New York state temporarily "at the request of the Administration in Washington."

Nov. 17—Governor and Mrs. Nelson Rockefeller announce that they have separated as a preliminary to divorce.

Segregation

Nov. 8—The executive director of the Congress of Racial Equality announces that almost half of the restaurant owners on Route 40 in Maryland have agreed to desegregate their facilities.

Fort Worth, Texas, is ordered to begin racial integration in its public schools in the fall of 1962.

Nov. 13—It is reported by *Southern School News* that 5 additional school districts desegregated in the 1961-1962 school year.

Nov. 21—Three Mississippi laws requiring segregated transportation station facilities are ruled unconstitutional by a 3-judge federal court.

Nov. 27—Virginia's Supreme Court rules that Virginia must maintain free public schools for all children.

Supreme Court

Nov. 20—The Court rules unanimously that a state may treat men and women differently with regard to jury service. A Florida statute making jury duty compulsory for men and voluntary for women is upheld.

VATICAN, THE

Nov. 15—The Most Rev. Arthur C. Lichtenberger, President Bishop of the Protes-

tant Episcopal Church of the U.S., has a private audience with Pope John XXIII. This is the first meeting between the Pope and a head of the U.S. Episcopal Church.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Nov. 1—It is reported that recently over 500 Viet Cong (Communist Vietnamese) guerrillas were killed fighting Vietnam troops.

Nov. 3—Returning after 3 weeks, General Maxwell D. Taylor and the other members of his mission to Southeast Asia report to U.S. President Kennedy on the situation in Southeast Asia, particularly in South Vietnam.

Nov. 7—It is reported that South Vietnamese authorities have strong evidence that Viet Cong guerrillas have bases on Cambodian soil from which they can make attacks on South Vietnam. (See also *Cambodia*.)

Nov. 12—Informed sources in Saigon report that U.S. jets are providing aerial reconnaissance over Viet Cong fortifications to help South Vietnamese planes strike against the guerrillas.

Nov. 15—The National Assembly approves special budgetary powers for President Ngo Dinh Diem for 2 years.

At a meeting of the National Security Council in Washington, the U.S. adopts certain measures for helping South Vietnam rebuff intensified Communist guerrilla pressure. No U.S. combat troops are to be sent. The U.S. will supply specialists to train South Vietnamese troops in guerrilla warfare. Aircraft and other special equipment will be sent to South Vietnam. It is reported that these measures follow General Taylor's recommendations.

YUGOSLAVIA

Nov. 13—President Tito, at a ceremony marking the completion of the first all-paved road from West Europe to Greece (less a 6-mile stretch) accuses the U.S. of attempting to use economic pressure against Yugoslavia. He criticizes U.S. failures to act on the Yugoslav request to purchase surplus wheat.

Nov. 23—The U.S. tells Yugoslavia it is ready to negotiate on the request for an additional 500,000 tons of U.S. surplus wheat.

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